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Open or Closed: 
Balancing Border Policy with Human Rights 
Elizabeth M. Bruch• 
"We are living in a time when civil rights, meaning basic human rights, are 
being reformulated, redefined, and extended to new categories of people." 
Roger Nett (1971)2 
''We should not be afraid of open borders." 
Bill Ong Hing (2006)3 
INTRODUCTION 
PEN borders have not been a popular idea in the United States for 
at least a century.4 Since the federal government became involved 
in immigration regulation in the late 1800s, the history of immigration 
policy has generally been one of increasing restrictions and limitations.5 
1 Associate Professor of Law, Valparaiso University School of Law; Visiting Scholar, 
Centre for Feminist Legal Studies, Law Faculty, University of British Columbia. I am grate-
ful to the Potomac Valley Writers Workshop for valuable review and critique of a draft of this 
article at the winter meeting, and especially to Johanna Bond and Margaret Johnson, and my 
colleague Jeremy Telman. I am also indebted to Dave Gage for his support and encourage-
ment, to Marc Sanchez for research assistance, and to the students in my immigration law 
courses at Valparaiso University School of Law and Notre Dame Law School for their many 
thoughtful questions and comments over the past several years on issues related to borders, 
immigration and citizenship. 
2 Roger Nett, Tlte Civil Right~ Ate Not Ready For: The Right of Free Movement of People on 
the Face of the Earth, 81 ETHICS 212 (1971). 
3 Closing Remarks of Professor Bill Ong Hing, Transcript, Hastings Race and Poverty Law 
Journal Third Annual Symposium: Economic Justice; Growing Inequality in Amenca, 3 HASTINGS 
RAcE & PovERTY L.j. 141, 157 (2oo6). 
4 However, they were essential to the early development of the nation. 1 CHARLES 
GORDON, STANLEY MAILMAN & STEPHEN YALE-LOEHR, IMMIGRATION LAW AND PROCEDURE § 
2.02[ 1] (2004). The first general federal immigration law was adopted in 1882. I d. § 2.02[2] 
(imposing a head tax and excluding "idiots, lunatics, convicts, and persons likely to become 
a public charge"). 
5 GoRDON, MAILMAN & YALE-LOEHR, supra note 4, at §§ 2.02-2.04 (tracing the histo-
ry of immigration legislation in the U.S.). The most noted exception to this trend is the 
Immigration Act of 1990, Pub. L. No. 101-649, 104 Stat. 4978 ( 1990). However, the two major 
immigration laws of 1996, the Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act (AEDPA) and 
the Illegal Immigration Reform and Immigrant Responsibility Act (IIRIRA), returned to the 
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As is true for many issues in immigration law, the debate on borders has 
shifted even more dramatically in the years since the attacks of September 
11, 2001. The national agenda on immigration has been focused on 
increased enforcement, tightening or strengthening the borders, and, in 
some cases, restricting immigration. In fact, the only immigration-related 
accomplishment of the last Congress was a bill authorizing a 700-mile 
fence along the U.S.-Mexico border.6 Although the project has not been 
adequately funded and many think it will never be built, the bill illustrates, 
at least, the level of political debate on the border in the United States. 
In light of the well-known historical failure and repudiation of fences 
and walls between nations, this suggests a new low point in the national 
policy discussion.7 The current Congress may not do much better. At this 
writing, Congress has essentially abandoned consideration of a proposed 
comprehensive immigration reform bill.8 A selection of immigration bills of 
smaller scope are being discussed, but the overall tenor of the immigration 
debate remains centered on restriction and enforcement. 
Notwithstanding this trend in law and policy towards closing the 
borders, many Americans are more conflicted and nuanced in their views on 
restrictionist trend, as have subsequent legislative efforts. See Antiterrorism and Effective 
Death Penalty Act of 1996, Pub. L. No. 104-132, 110 Stat. 1214 (1996); Illegal Immigration 
Reform and Responsibility Act of 1996, Pub. L. No. 104-208, 1 10 Stat. 3009-546 (1996) (codi-
fied in various sections of 8 U.S. C.). 
6 Secure Fence Act of 2006, Pub. L. No. 109-367, 120 Stat. 2638 (2006) (authorizing 
70o-mile fence to "establish operational control over the international land and maritime bor-
ders of the United States"). 
7 See Daniel Benjamin, Wall of Shame I961-1989, TIME, Nov. 20, 1989 at 42, available at 
http://www.time.com/time/daily/special/berlin/wall.html (describing the deaths and separa-
tion of families caused by and the symbolic significance of the Berlin Wall); Nett, supra note 
2, at 224 ("building walls is a peculiarly lonely job and an admission of the inadequacy of the 
system"). 
8 SeeS. 1348, I lOth Cong. (2007) (A bill to provide for "comprehensive immigration re-
form and for other purposes"). At the time it was introduced to much fanfare, Senator Richard 
]. Durbin of Illinois said: "'This bill is drawing opposition from business, labor, Democrats, 
Republicans, theists and nontheists, American League and National League baseball fans. 
What I'm trying to say to you is there's more opposition to this bill than support. The force 
behind this compromise is the understanding that if we fail, the process ends probably for the 
next two years."' Robert Pear and Michael Luo, Senate Votes, 64-31, to Retain Temporary Worker 
Program in Immigration Measure, N.Y. TIMES, May 23, 2007, at 20. Despite claims that the draft 
legislation represented a "'grand bargain"' addressing a broad range of immigration concerns, 
it reflected a troubling emphasis on restriction and enforcement. /d. The proposed legisla-
tion included: additional enforcement provisions (border enforcement and interior enforce-
ment, including increased workplace enforcement); a temporary worker program (with limits 
on time period and caps on total numbers); reallocation of permanent resident visas (fewer 
family-based and more employment-based for professional and other skilled workers); and a 
long-term path to citizenship for some undocumented persons currently in the United States 
(after payment of fines and penalties, a \vaiting period and other qualifications). S. 1348, 11oth 
Cong. (2007). See also AILA InfoNet, Doc. No. 07051768 (posted May 17, 2007), Summary of 
Senate "Grand Bargain," http://wW\v.aila.org/content/default.aspx?bc= 1 o 1 9!67 1 2!8846122365. 
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immigration, recognizing the potential advantages as well as the potential 
disadvantages.9 I see this conflict reflected in ·my immigration law course 
each semester~ I begin the course by taking an informal poll of students' 
views~ I ask them to place themselves on the s.p·ectrum of im.migration 
policy, choosing from closed borders (no immigration), to more restrictions 
on immigration, to the current leveJs of (and policy toward) immigration, to 
fewer restrictions on immigration, or open borders (unfettered immigration). 
Students spread across that spectrum, but the most interesting answers 
are at either end. I have yet to have a student advocate for completely 
closed borders, but every year a few students vote for completely open 
borders. Why then does national policy give so little consideration to this 
perspective? 
This article considers the role of borders in U.S. immigration law and 
the influence of international law in shaping that role. The international 
law doctrine of sovereignty, with the re.lated concepts of territorial integrity 
and national autonomy, has served as a foundational concept for a U.S. 
immigration policy that favors restrictions on immigration "closing" the 
borders. However, an evolved understanding of the role. of sovereignty 
in international law, and in particular its relationship to human rights, also 
offers the possibility of a radical reevaluation of immigration policy that 
would remove many of the current limitations on immigration "opening'' 
the borders. 10 This article contends that U.S. policy is out of balance when it 
9 A recent New York Times/CBS Poll suggests that ·rwo-thirds of Americans favor both a 
guest-worker program and a path to citizenship for those "with [a] good employment history 
and no criminal record" currently present in the U.S. without authorization. Julia Preston and 
Marjorie Connelly, Immigration Bill Provisions Gain lVide Support in Po//, N.Y. TIMES, May 25, 
2007, at 1. Interestingly, the article also notes that almost on e.-half of ,the poll respondents fa-
vor some controls on immigration, with the remaining respondents equally divided in favor of 
either completely open borders or completely closed borders. ld~ ("These polarized positions 
may help explain the acrimony of the immigration debate across the nation") See also Most 
Americans Favor Guest-Worker Program: Poll, REUTERS, Nov. 22, 2006, available at http://www. 
reuters.com/article/domesticNews/idUSN2I387986zoo61 122 (reporting nationwide poll by 
Quinnipiac University, which found that most Americans believe that unauthorized immi-
grants should be allowed to work and eventually become citizens, yet a majority also believe 
Congress should do more to address unauthorized entry). Even in the border stares, such as 
Texas, there is a range of views: "'Our opinions were kind of left out . . . . Here we are in the 
midst of an economic mega-boom and we're building fences .... What ridiculous symbolism. 
Here we are tearing walls down around the world and we're putting up walls [in the U.S.]"' 
See Lynn Brezosky, Border Texans See Holes in Fence Proposal, ALBUQUERQUE).; Oct. 26, 2006, 
available at http://'Www.abqjournal.com/ne.ws/state/apholes 1 o-26-o6.htm (quoting Laredo 
Mayor Raul Salinas). 
10 Although the voices in support of open borders are relatively few, they are eloquent. 
Professor Kevin Johnson has written the mosr recent and ·comprehensive argument in support 
of open borders. Kevin R. johnson, Open Borders?, 5 r UCLA L. REv. 193 (2003) (discussing 
the moral, economic and ·policy arguments in support of open borders). A recent report of the 
Global Commission on International Migration also cogently summarizes important arguments 
in ·support of migration without borders. Antoine Pecoud and Paul de Guchteneire, Migration. 
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over-emphasizes restrictions on immigration "closed" borders without 
considering countervailing policy goals and values that would encourage 
fewer restrictions ''open'' borders. It aspires to reinvigorate and redirect 
the public conversation in this area by drawing upon international human 
rights law to encourage a more expansive consideration of the spectrum of 
options from "closed" to "open" for our borders. 
Part I of this article discusses the historical justifications, grounded 
in international law, in support of closed borders in the U.S.; it also 
illustrates how current immigration law gives prominence to this restrictive 
approach. 11 The article then examines in Part II arguments in support of 
open borders, grounded in a modern understanding of international law, 
including international human rights law. 12 It suggests how such a revised 
approach might be reflected in U.S. immigration law. Finally, the article 
concludes that the present emphasis in the U.S. on closing the borders is 
inconsistent with the expansion of human rights and may ultimately be 
ineffective in countering the economic, cultural and security concerns that 
underlie a restrictionist approach to the borders.13 
I. CLosED BoRDERs: SovEREIGNTY, SEcURITY AND SELECTIVITY 
Although it is rarely framed this way in discussions of U.S. immigration 
law, U.S. borders and U.S. sovereignty within those borders are a function 
of international law as much as -or more than domestic. law. The U.S. 
Supreme Court relied on the international law doctrine of sovereignty in 
one of the foundational cases of immigration law, Chae Chan Ping v. United 
States (the Chinese Exclusion Case) in 1889.14 In that case, the Court articulated 
an expansive view of national sovereignty, based on international law, to 
justify federal regulation of immigration matters: sovereignty empowers 
a nation both to select who it will include as citizen-member or guest and 
to exclude those it deems to be a threat or otherwise undesirable. 15 The 
Court has reaffirmed that expansive view of sovereign power repeatedly 
in subsequent years. 16 The Court's sovereignty-based approach laid the 
without Borders: An Investigation into the Free Movement of People, 27 GLOBAL MIGRATION PERSP. 
1 (April 2005) Of.Jailable at http://www.gcim.org/attachements/GMP%2oNo%2027.pdf. Roger 
Nett started this discussion over 35 years ago. See Nett, supra note 2, at 212. My interest in 
and thoughts on this issue have been greatly influenced by these writers. 
11 See infra notes 14-77 and accompanying text. 
12 See infra notes 78-I 6o and accompanying text. 
13 See infra conclusion. 
14 Chae Chan Ping v. United States (Chinese Exclusion Case), I30 U.S. 58 I (I889). 
IS /d. at 6o4-o5 (affirming that "the United States, in their relation to foreign countries 
and their subjects or citizens, are one nation, invested with powers which belong co indepen-
dent nations" and listing a range of related "sovereign" powers). 
16 See Zadvydas v. Davis, 533 U.S. 678, 717 (2001) (Kennedy, j., dissenting) (character-
izing detention decision in the context of removal as a "sovereign power"); Miller v. Albright, 
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foundation for "plenary" federal power in the area of immigration, and that 
sovereignty-based approach has been used and continues to be used to 
justify any subsequent efforts to limit, restrict or eliminate immigration. 17 
A. International Law Support for Closed Borders 
The sovereignty of nation-states forms a bedrock principle of public 
international law. 18 Its theoretical ascendancy occurred in the 1800s, and 
it was particularly current during the era of the Chinese Exclusion Case. 19 
It is integrally related both to principles of autonomy and to the idea of 
territorial integrity. 20 As a matter of international law, the essential aspects 
523 U.S. 420, 428-29 ( 1998) (relying on Fiallo); Fiallo v. Bell, 430 U.S. 787, 792 (1977) (cit-
ing earlier decisions and noting that "(o]ur recent decisions have not departed from this 
long-established rule"); Kleindienst v. Mandel, 408 U.S. 753, 765-66 ( 1972) (citing the Chinese 
Exclusion Case and Fong Yue Ting v. United States and noting that "the Court's general reaffir-
mations of this principle have been legion"); Harisiades v. Shaughnessy, 342 U.S. s8o, 587--88 
( 1952) ("That aliens remain vulnerable to expulsion after long residence is a practice that 
bristles with severities. But it is a weapon of defense and reprisal confirmed by international 
law as a power inherent in every sovereign state"); Fong Yue Ting v. United States, 149 U.S. 
698, 711 (1893) (~'[t]he right to exclude or to expel all aliens, or any class of aliens, absolutely 
or upon certain conditions, in war or in peace, [is] an inherent and inalienable right of every 
sovereign and independent nation, essential to its safety, its independence, and its welfare"); 
Ekiu v. United States, 142 U.S. 651, 659 (1892) ("every sovereign nation has the power, as 
inherent in sovereignty, and essential to self-preservation, to forbid the entrance of foreigners 
within its dominions, or to admit them only in such cases and upon such conditions as it may 
see fit to prescribe"). 
17 There is a vast body of legal scholarship on the concept of the federal "plenary pow-
er" in immigration and debate on its continuing vitality. Some recent examples include: T. 
Alexander Aleinikoff, Detaining Plenary Power: The Meaning and Impact of Zadvydas v. Davis, 
16 GEo. IMMIGR. L.j. 365 (2002); Gabriel j. Chin, Is tAere a Plenary Power Doctrine? A Tentative 
Apology and Prediction for Our Strange but Unexceptional Constitutional Immigration Law, 14 GEo. 
IMMIGR. L.j. 257 (2ooo); johnson, supra note 10, at 289; Stephen H. Legomsky, Immigration 
Exceptionalism: Commentary on Is tltere a Plenary Power Doctrine?, 14 GEo. IMMIGR. L.j. 307 
(2ooo); Victor C. Romero, On Elian and Aliens~· A Political Solution to tire Plenary Power Problem, 
4 N.Y. U.J. LEGIS. & Pus. PoL'v 343 (200 1 ); Peter j. Spiro, Explaining the End of Plenary Power, 
16 GEO. IMMIGR. L.J. 339 (2002). 
18 IAN BROWNLIE, PRINCIPLEs oF PuBLic INTERNATIONAL LAw 289 (sch ed. 1999) ("The 
sovereignty and equality of states represent the basic constitutional doctrine of the law of 
nations, which governs a community consisting primarily of states having a uniform legal 
personality"). See id. at 106 ("The normal complement of state rights, the typical case of 
legal competence, is described commonly as 'sovereignty' .... "). john Boli, Sovereignty from 
a World Polity Perspective, in PROBLEMATIC SovEREIGNTY: CoNTESTED RuLES AND PoLITICAL 
PosSIBILITIES 53 (Stephen D. Krasner, ed., Columbia Univ. Press 2001) ("it is hardly too much 
to say that it constitutes a core element in the very definition of the state"). 
19 BROWNLIE, supra note 18, at 126 (describing historical changes in concepts of law, in-
cluding sovereignty); see Satvinder S. juss, Free Movm~ent and World Order, 16 INT'L j. REFUGEE 
L~ 289, 297-302 (2004) (describing the evolving relationship between sovereignty and migra-
tion). 
20 BROWNLIE, supra note 18, at 105-o6 ("The state territory ... together with the govern-
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of national sovereignty include equality and equal relations between states 
and the autonomy to consent (or not) to relationships and obligations among 
states. 21 Fundamentally, the idea of national sovereignty is the power to 
exercise authority over the individuals living within the territory of the 
state and to act on behalf of those citizen-members of the state. 22 However, 
in addition to these powers to act affirmatively toward and on behalf of its 
own population, sovereignty also empowers a state to exclude other states 
-and by extension; the populations of other s~ates to prevent them from 
intruding upon or interfering with the territorial integrity of the state. 23 
Despite the historical links between national sovereignty and the powers 
to include and exclude, the United States government did not initially 
assert much control in the area of immigration. For the first century of its 
existence, the United States allowed immigration matters to b,e addressed 
primarily by the individual states.24 However, in 1889, that shifted abruptly 
with the Supreme Court's decision in the Chinese Exclusion Case.25 In 
that case, the Court determined that the power to regulate immigration 
was vested in the federal government.26 The Court did not reach that 
conclusion by relying on any express constitutional power or provision.27 
ment and population within its frontie·rs, comprise the physical and social manifestations of 
the primary type of international legal person, the state"); ANTONIO CASSESE, INTERNATIONAL 
LAw 87 (2oo 1) (noting the· centrality of sovereign equality, togeth·er with other principles, such 
as the ban on intervention in the affairs of other states, equal rights and self.:..(ietermination 
of peoples). 
21 BROWNLIE, supra note 18, at 289 ("sovereignty is in a major aspect a relation to other 
states (and to organizations of states) defined by law"). CASSESE, supra note 20, at88-91 (de-
scribing the distinct but related notions of sovereignty and legal equality). These principles 
are also reflected in the: U.N. Charter, article 2.1, which states: "The Organization is based on 
the principle of the sovereign equality ofall its Members~" U .. N. Charter art. 2, para. 1. 
22 CASSESE, supra note 20, at 89. See BROWNLIE, supra note 18~ at. 289-90. In particular, 
nation ... states have historically been considered "exclusively in control of nationality mat-
ters.'' /d. at 385-86. 
23 CASSESE, supra note 20, at 89. Other characteristics of sovereignty include various im-
munities for state actions and state officials, as well as respect for state nationals, officials and 
property abroad. /d. at 90. 
24 The main exception was the short-lived and controversial Alien Act of 1789 (part of 
the Alien and Sedition laws). GoRDON, MAtl.MAN & YALE-LOEHR, supra note 4, at § 2.02[ 1] 
(2004). The text of ''An Act Respecting Alien Enemies," 6th Con g., ( 1798), is available through 
the Avalon Project at Yale Law School at http://www. yale.edu/lawweb/avalon/statutes/alien. 
htm (last visited Oct. 5, 2007). 
~5 Chae Chan Ping v. United States (Chinese ExcltJSion Case), 130 U.S. 581,603 (1889). 
26 /d. ("That the government of the United States, through the action of the legislative 
department, can exclude aliens from its territory is a proposition which we do not think open 
to controversy''). 
27 The Court alludes, to general powers conferred on the federal government under the 
Constitution, such as the war power and other foreign relations powers, but does not cite any 
specific Constitutional provisions. Rather, the Court characterizes these as "sovereign;, pow-
ers./d. at 604. 
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Rather, the Court reached that conclusion by reasoning that the power to 
exclude noncitizens is embedded within the power of a nation to control its 
own territory a power that is inherent to all sovereign states~ 28 The Court 
simply asserted that the nature of sovereignty, an undisputed attribute of 
nation-states, required the power to exclude: 
[T]he United States; in their relation to foreign countries and their subjects 
or citizens are one nation, invested with powers which belong to independent 
nations, the exe-rcise of which can be invoked for the maintenance of its 
absolute independence and security throughout its entire territory. The 
powers to declare war, make treaties, suppress insurrection, repel invas-ion; 
regulate foreign commerce, secure republican governments to the States; 
and admit subjects of other nations to citizenship, are all sovereign powers, 
restricted in their exercise only by the-Constitution itself and ·considerations 
of public policy and justice which control, more or less, the conduct of all 
civilized nations. 29 
However, the Court buttressed that conclusion by enumerating other 
inherent and e-xpress powers of the federal government, such as the war 
powers, and linking the power to exclude to concerns of national security 
and cultural threat (though framed in the language of race and racism) 
that seem familiar today: 
• 
• 
To preserve its ind:ependence, and give-security against foreign aggression 
and encroachment, is the highest duty of every nation, and to attain these 
ends nearly all other considerations are to be subordinated. It matters 
not in what form such aggression and encroachment come, whether from 
the foreign nation acting in its national character, or from vast hordes of 
its people crowding in upon us . . . . If, therefore, the government of the-
United States, through its legislative department, considers the presence of 
foreigners of a different race in this country, who will not assimilate with us, 
to be dangerous to its peace and security, their exclusion is not to be stayed 
because at the time there are no actual hostilities with the nation of which 
the foreigners are subjects.30 
The Court reasoned that without the absolute power to exclude, the state 
would be subject to the control of another state . the state whose nationals 
it could not exclude.31 
28 /d. at 6o3-o4. Even in this expansive characterization of sovereignty, there is some 
-suggestion of limits based on "considerations of public policy and justice." /d. at 604. 
29 /d. The Court stated, "[t]hat the government of the United States; through the action 
of the legislative department, can exclude aliens from its territory is a proposition which we do 
not think is open to controversy. Jurisdiction over its own territory to that extent is an incident 
of every independent nation." !d. at 6o3. 
30 /d. at 6o6. 
31 /d. at 604. 
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Although the Chinese Exclusion Case was the first decision to ground the 
power to exclude in the inherent powers of sovereignty recognized as a 
matter of international law, this reasoning was reiterated by the Court in 
subsequent cases. In Ekiu v. United States, the Court stated: 
It is an accepted maxim of international law, that every sovereign nation 
has the power, as inherent in sovereignty, and essential to self-preservation, 
to forbid the entrance of foreigners within its dominions, or to admit them 
only in such cases and upon such conditions as it may see fit to prescribe.32 
Also, in Fong Yue Tingv. United States, the Coun quoted at some length the 
international law scholars VatteP3 and Ortolan34 to support the "inherent and 
inalienable right" of a sovereign nation to exclude or expel noncitizens. 35 
The domestic consequences of sovereignty in terms of the government's 
ability to exclude noncitizens have not been seriously reevaluated in the 
32 Ekiu v. United States, 142 U.S. 651,659 (1892) (deciding that noncitizens do not have 
due process rights in exclusion proceedings). 
33 The Court quoted Vattel as stating: 
'Every nation has the right to refuse to admit a foreigner into the coun-
try, when he cannot enter without putting the nation in evident danger, 
or doing it a manifest injury. What it owes to itself, the care of its own 
safety, gives it this right; and, in virtue of its natural libeny, it belongs 
to the nation to judge whether its circumstances will or will not justify 
the admission of the foreigner.' 'Thus, also, it has a right to send them 
elsewhere, if it has just cause to fear that they will corrupt the manners 
of the citizens; that they will create religious disturbances, or occasion 
any other disorder, contrary to the public safety. In a word, it has a right, 
and is even obliged, in this respect, to follow the rules which prudence 
dictates.' [sic] 
Fong Yue Ting v. United States, 149 U.S. 698, 707-708 (citing Vatt. Law Nat. lib. 1, c. 19, §§ 
230, 231 ). 
34 The Court quoted Ortolan as follows: 
The government of each state has always the right to compel foreigners 
who are found within its territory to go away, by having them taken to 
the frontier. This right is based on the fact that, the foreigner not mak-
ing part of the nation, his individual reception into the territory is matter 
of pure permission, of simple tolerance, and creates no obligation. The 
exercise of this right may be subjected, doubtless, to certain forms by 
the domestic laws of each country; but the right exists none the less, 
universally recognized and put in force. In France no special form is 
now prescribed in this matter; the exercise of this right of expulsion is 
wholly left to the executive power.' [sic] 
Fong Yue Ting, 149 U.S. at 708 (citing Ortolan, Diplomatie de Ia Mer, (4th Ed.) lib. 2, c. 14, p. 
297) (original in French)). 
35 /d. (quoting other international law scholars as well). See cases cited supra note 16 as 
more recent examples of the Court's reliance on international law and the inherent powers of 
sovereignty to justify immigration restrictions. 
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United States since these early decisions even though the international 
meaning and understanding of sovereignty has evolved significantly since 
the 1880s and with greater rapidity within the last decades.36 The Supreme 
Court continues to defer to the political branches' "plenary power" in 
the area of immigration, particularly the inherent and absolute power to 
exclude as a function of sovereignty.37 As in the Chinese Exclusion Case and 
other early cases, the rationale for such a sweeping view of sovereignty is 
often, expressly or implicitly, related to concerns about national security or 
the cultural or economic impact of immigration. 
B. Closing the Borders in Current U.S. Immigration Law 
Current U.S. immigration law and policy also continue to reflect this 
sweeping view of sovereignty and the absolute power to exclude. The 
resulting "closure" of the borders is evident in various strands of the 
national approach to immigration: from limits on lawful immigration and 
naturalization,38 to increased border enforcement efforts,39 to physical 
obstacles,40 to the current popularity of border vigilantism.41 Unsurprisingly, 
the arguments in favor of closed borders have been closely linked to 
national sovereignty, and they have spanned a familiar range of concerns 
about threats to national security, detrimental economic impact or cultural 
change, and general apprehension about opening the "floodgates. "42 
36 See cases cited supra note 16. 
37 See, e.g., Zadvydas v. Davis, 533 U.S. 678, 717 (20o1) (Kennedy, j., dissenting); Miller v. 
Albright, 523 U.S. 420 (1998) (Scalia, j., concurring) (citing earlier decisions for the description 
of "the power to expel or exclude aliens as a fundamental sovereign attribute"). 
38 Limits on lawful immigration are set forth primarily in the Immigration and Nationality 
Act, 8 U.S.C. § 1101 (2ooo) [hereinafter INA]. See infra notes 4o-46, so-52 and accompanying 
text. 
39 Enforcement of the national borders is primarily entrusted to the Customs and Border 
Patrol, a subdivision of the Department of Homeland Security. 1 Immigration Law Service 
2d § 1: 132. The Border Patrol is responsible for patrolling over 7 ,ooo miles of land border 
and over 2,000 miles of coastal waters. /d. Other subdivisions within the Department of 
Homeland Security and other agencies are also involved in some aspects of border enforce-
ment. I d. § 1:128. 
40 Physical obstacles include fencing, border patrols, and a range of technologies. See 
infra notes s<)-6o and accompanying text. 
41 The Minuteman Project is perhaps the most well-known, but there are others as 
well. SeeThe Minuteman Project, http://www.minutemanproject.com/. Other groups include 
Ranch Rescue USA and American Border Patrol. See also, Charlie LeDufT, Illegal Immigrants 
File Suit Against Vigilante Patrols, N.Y. TIMES, May 30, 2003, at A2o; infra note 61 and accom-
• panytng text. 
42 Perhaps unsurprisingly, the arguments made today are similar to those anticipated 
by Roger Nett in 1971 in his consideration of a right to free movement. Nett, supra note 2, 
at 223 ("Where migration is not allowed, it is usually in the name of national security or else 
based on the claim that there is no place for the immigrants or no prospect for their gainful 
employment"). 
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Even a relatively cursory examination of current U.S. immigration law 
reflects this perspective_. As an initial matter, immigration to this country 
is not unlimited, either in terms of raw numbers or in terms of the types of 
immigration available.43 There is an annual c~p of approximately 675,000 
persons who may immigrate to the United States, and within that cap 
there are further limits by country.44 In addition, prospective immigrants 
must fit into one of the available categories of immigration; it is not 
enough simply to want to immigrate to the United States. Congress has 
established affirmative categories of persons who may immigrate and has 
set preferences within those categories. 45 In general terms, the categories 
comprise immediate relatives, family-sponsored, employment-based, 
diversity or refugee immigration.4Q The categories represent policy 
judgments about who is desirable (or, at least, acceptable) as an immigrant. 
Without a family connection, particular employment skills, a claim of 
persecution, or the good luck to prevail in the diversity lottery, an aspiring 
·. 
immigrant is without options. 
Immigration into the U.S. is a two-step process: potential immigrants 
must affirmatively fit into one of the eligible categories, but they must also 
avoid being eliminated based on one ofthe many grounds ofinadmissibility.47 
43 The first federal law limiting immigration was passed in 1875 barring "convicts and 
prostitutes." GoRDON, MAILMAN & YALE-LOEHR, supra note 4, at§ 2.02. Since that time, both 
quantitative limits numerical limits and qualitative limits limits on the types of individ-
uals who may immigrate have been added to the immigration laws. The general pattern has 
been to expand, rather than contract, those limitations. See supra note 4· 
44 INA, 8 U.S.C. § I ISI(cHe) (2ooo) (setting forth the annual limits for family-spon-
sored, employment-based and diversity immigrants);seea/so 8 U.S.C. § 1152 (2ooo) (discussing 
per country numerical limitations). The provisions set for the calculations, including ceilings 
and in some cases floors; the actual numbers vary from year to year. F o.r example, the annual 
Yearbook of Immigration Statistics lists the following numbers of persons obtaining Lawful 
Permanent Residence in recent years: 1,122,373 in FY 2oos; 957,883 in FY 2004; 703,542 
in FY 2003; 1,059,356 in FY 2002; and 1 ,os8,902 in FY 2001 ~ · See OFFICE OF IMMIGRATION 
STATISTICS, 2005 YEARBOOK OF IMMIGRATION STATISTlCS, s, Table 1, available at, http://WWW. 
dhs.gov/xlibrary/assets/statistics/yearbook/2oos/OIS_200S_ Yearbook. pdf [hereinafter 2005 
YEARBOOK OF IMMIGRATION STATISTics]. Moreover, these provisions relate only to permanent 
immigration, as opposed to nonimmigrant entries, such as students and visitors, which are 
temporary in nature and involve much higher numbers. 
45 INA, 8 U.S.C. § 1 1 53(a)-(c) (2ooo) ((a) listing family-sponsored preference categories, 
(b) listing employment-based preference categories, and (c) describing diversity preference). 
See also 8 U.S.C. § I 151(b)(2)(A)(i) (2000) (exempting immediate relatives from the numerical 
limitations); 8 U.S. C.§ I 157 (2ooo) (regarding annual admissions of refugees). 
46 8 U.S.C. § 1 15r. If a prospective immigrant does not fit within one of the eligible 
categories, he or she is ineligible to enter the United States as an immigrant, regardless of 
other merit or interest. Those who seek to enter the United States are presumed to be im-
migrants rather than non-immigrants unless they can prove otherwise. See 8 U.S.C. § 
IIOI(a)( 15) (2ooo) (defining an "immigrant" as any noncitizen who does not fit within one 
of the specified categories of ''nonimmigrant aliens,); 8 U.S.C § 1 184(b) (2000) (noncitizen is 
presumed to be an immigrant unless he or she can establish otherwise). 
47 8 U.S. C . § 1182(a) (2000) (setting forth the categories of excludable noncitizens). The 
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The Immigration and Nationality Act includes ten general categories of 
inadmissibility, including a catch-all miscellaneous category, each with 
numerous sub-parts.48 Much like the affirmative categories, these negative 
prohibitions also reflect judgments as to who should be allowed into the 
country as an immigrant.49 For example, a person "likely to become a public 
charge" is inadmissible, as are persons with certain mental and physical 
disorders. 5° In spite of desirable characteristics such as a family connection 
or a valuable employment skill, a potential immigrant who falls within one 
of the inadmissibility grounds will not be permitted to immigrate. 
In addition to these hurdles, there are further constraints on immigrants 
while they are present in the United States, most notably the ongoing risk 
of removal51 and the limits on the ability of immigrants to naturalize to 
citizenship. 52 The affirmative and negative limits on immigration, together 
with the complexity of the laws and procedures involved, serve to close the 
borders and restrict the flow of immigration. 53 The rationales for many of 
these limits reflect selectivity in the decision to include policy choices 
grounds of exclusion include health-related grounds., crime-related grounds, security-related 
grounds, economic grounds (e.g., the likelihood that a noncitizen will become a public charge, 
and the labor certification process that is designed to protect U.S. workers), immigration con-
trol grounds, and miscellaneous other grounds. 
48 The grounds of inadmissibility are set forth in the INA, 8 U.S.C. § 1 f82(a) (2ooo) and 
its various su ~sections. 
49 It is typically easier to enter the United States as a nonimmigrant than as an immi-
grant. In 2005, approximately 175 million noncitizens were admitted as nonimmigrants to the 
United States. See ELIZABETH l\.1. GRIECO, OFFICE OF IMMIGRATION STATISTICS, ANNUAL FLow 
REPORT (2005), TEMPORARY ADMISSIONS OF NoNIMMIGRANTS TO THE UNITED STATES: 2005, at 
. . 
1, available at http://www.dhs.gov/xlibrary/assets/statistics/publications/2oos_NI_rpt.pdf. In 
comparison, the number of immigrants admitted for 2005 was just over 1 .. 1 million. See 2005 
YEARBOOK OF IMMIGRATION STATISTICS, supra note 44, at 5, Table 1. 
so See 8 U.S.C. § I 182(a)(4) (excluding any noncitizen "likely at any time to become a 
public charge"); /d.§ 1 I82(a)( 1) (excluding noncitizens with particular diseases or with physi-
cal or mental disorders that may threaten the property, safety or welfare of themselves or 
others). 
51 8 U.S.C. § 1227(a) (2ooo) (setting forth the categories of deportable noncitizens). The 
grounds for removal paraHel in many respects the grounds of exclusion and encompass con-
duct both within and outside the United States. They include grounds related to violations 
of the immigration laws, criminal offenses, documentary fraud, national security, likelihood of 
becoming a public charge, and unlawful voting. /d. For many grounds, there is no limitations 
period, and an immigrant can be deported at any time even decades later after the relevant 
violation or offense. See, e.g., /d. §1 227(a)(2)(A)(iii) (a noncitizen "convicted of an aggravated 
felony at any time after admission is deportable"). 
52 See INA, 8 U.S.C. §§ 1423-.27 (2ooo) (stating requirements for naturalization and 
grounds for prohibiting naturalization). The requirements include both affirmative require-
ments, such as having an understanding of the English language and knowledge of history and 
civics, and negative requirements, such as the prohibition on membership in the Communist 
Party or any other totalitarian party. 8 U.S. C. §§ 1423-24. 
53 See, e.g., 8 U.S. C. §§ I 154, tt86(a) (for a statutory overview of the complex procedures 
for obtaining immigrant status based on marriage and family relationships). 
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about desirable and undesirable immigrants · and also concerns about 
national security and other explicit and implicit threats:-in the decision 
to exclude. 
Similarly, and more obviously, increased border enforcement efforts 
reflect a desire to close the borders to immigration, particularly to 
unauthorized or irregular immigration. 54 Potential immigrants who do not 
fit within one of the designated categories are turned away. 55 Immigrants 
who are present in the United States without authorization are subject to 
"removal" or even "expedited removaL"56 Immigrants who have violated 
immigration law in the past are subject to additional bars on admission 
or reentry in the future, sometimes indefinitely.57 In addition, tremendous 
financial and personnel resources are devoted to staffing the borders and 
enforcing the immigration laws, 5·8 explicit efforts to restrict the flow of 
immigration and tighten the borders. 59 
54 Although "illegal aliens', and "illegal immigration'' are common terms in public 
discourse, they have developed needlessly pejorative connotations. This article will instead 
use the alternative terms of "unauthorized immigration" or "irregular immigration." 
55 The Department of Homeland Security's Office of Immigration Statistics provides 
relevant enforcement numbers for "apprehensions, investigations, detention and removal" 
annually. 2005 YEARBOOI( OF IMMIGRATION STATISTICS supra note 44, at I; see it/ at 9 I-I 24 
(providing statistics for zoos); see also MARY DouGHERTY, DENISE WILSON, & AMY Wu, OFFICE 
OF IMMIGRATION STATISTICS, IMMIGRATION ENFORCEMENT ACTIONS: 2005 1-5 (2006), available 
at http://www~dhs.gov/xlibrary/assets/statistics/yearbook/2005/E nforcemen t_AR_os. pdf. 
56 See INA, 8 U.S.C. § I 229(a) (2ooo) (describing removal process); 8 U.S.C. §§ 1225, 1228 
(desc(ibing expedited removal). In 2005, there were "208,521 noncitizens formally removed 
from the United States[;r' of those, 35 percent, or 72,91 .I, were removed through the expe-
dited removal process. DouGHERTY ET AL., supra note 55, at I. 
57 Section 212(a) of the Immigration and Nationality Act sets forth numerous bars on 
re entry for those who have violated the immigration laws. For example, failure to appear 
for removal hearing without reasonable cause renders a noncitizen inadmissible for 5 years. 8 
U.S.C. § 1 182(a)(6)(B) (2ooo). If a noncitizen is ordered removed, he or she becomes inadmis-
sible for either 5 or 10 years from date of removal, depending on when proceedings are initi-
ated. The bar on reentry goes up to 20 years after a second or subsequent removal, and it is 
permanent in case of removal based on an "aggravated felony." !d.§ 1182(a)(9)(A). There are 
also bars on reentry after periods of "unlawful presence" in the U.S. See id. § 1182(a)(9)(B). 
58 The U.S. Customs and Border Protection states that on a "typical day" in 2006, it 
employed 42,000 employees (including 18,ooo officers and 12,300 Border Patrol agents); 
processed 1.1 million persons (including 68o,ooo noncitizens); executed over 3,000 arr~sts 
and apprehensions; and refused entry to over 6oo persons. U.S. CusToMs AND BoRDER 
PROTECTION, "ON A 'TYPICAL DAY" FACT SHEET at 1 (2007), available at http://www.cbp.gov/ 
linkhandler/cgov/newsroom/fact_:sheets/cbp_overview/cypical_day.ctt/typical_day.pdf(listing 
various statistics). The President's proposed budget for Customs and Border Protection for FY 
2007 is approximately $8 billion. See U.S. CusTOMS AND BoRDER PROTECTION, CBP BUDGET IN 
BRIEF (2007), available at http://wwW.cbp.gov/xp/cgov/toolbox/about/accomplish/ (posted Aug. 
61 2007); see also 2005 YEARBOOK OF IMMIGRATION STATISTICS, supra note 44, at 91-124, Tables 
34-42 (describing enforcement actions). 
59 See Ask the White House, Comments of Michael Chenoff, Secretary of Homeland 
Security, (Nov. 30, 2005); available at http://www. whitehouse.gov/ask/2005 I IJO.html ("Gaining 
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Finally, in recent years, the effort to close the borders has expanded to 
include both physical obstacles and popular participation in "enforcement" 
efforts~ Approximately 14 miles of the U.S.-Mexico border are now fenced, 
and recent legislation has called for an additional 700 miles of fencing.60 In 
addition to the actual physical fencing, there are more border patrol officers 
and a wide range of monitoring technology, such as automatic drones and 
motion detectors.61 Despite the many increased efforts to patrol the borders, 
there remains such a level of frustration by some members of the public 
at the limits of enforcement that grassroots organizations, most notably 
the Minutemen, 62 have sprung up to "assist" with. government efforts to 
enforce the borders. 
The arguments in favor of closed borders and in support of measures to 
effectuate them have been closely linked to the original notion ofsovereignty 
reflected in the Chinese Exclusion Case. Moreover, these arguments feature a 
similar range of concerns from national security worries to anxiety about 
the economic and cultural impact of immigrants and an overarching fear 
that the nation will be overwhelmed if the immigration "floodgates" are 
opened. 63 The concern about national security is most obviously linked 
full control of our borders is a priority for the Department of Homeland Security .... It is not 
practical to believe that we can seal our border entirely, but we can create such a high likeli-
hood of interdiction that it will create an unequivocal deterrent effect on those who wish to 
cross illegally"). 
6o Secure Fence Act of 2006, Pub. L. No. 109-367 (enacted Oct. 26, 2006) (authorizing 
70o-mile fence to "establish operational control over the international land and maritime bor-
ders of the United States"). See Ted Robbins, Bush Signs Border Fence Act; Funds Not Found, 
(Q&A: Building a Barrier Along the Border with MexicoApr 16, 2006), NATIONAL PuBLIC RAnro, 
Oct. 26, 2006, http://www.nppr.org/templates/story/story.php?storyld+6388s48. 
61 See U.S. CusTOMS AND BoRDER PROTECTION, CBP BoRDER PATROL OvERVIEW, ovailable 
at http://www.cbp.gov/xp/cgov/border_security/border_patrol/overview.xml (describing use of 
electronic sensors, video monitoring, night vision scopes, as well as vehicle and air surveillance 
capabilities). 
62 The Minutemen describe themselves as citizens "doing the job Congress won't do." 
Steve Lopez, Posse is Headed for the Wrong Roundup, L.A. TIMES, Apr. 1, 2005, at B 1. Among 
their projects is "Operation Sovereignty," designed to "draw attention to illegal immigration 
and border violence[,] ... spotting undocumented immigrants and reporting them to authori-
ties." Mariana Castillo, Tempers Flare as Minutemen Take to Border, SAN-ANTONIO ExPRESS-
NEws, Sept. 12, 2006, at 1 B; see also The Minuteman Project, http://www.minutemanproject. 
com/. State and local government officials, particularly in the border states, have also become 
increasingly frustrated with federal action in this area. As a result, some states and municipali-
ties have become more active in making their own efforts to enforce the borders. In August 
2005, the governors of New Mexico and Arizona declared "states of emergency" for various 
regions in their states due co increases in unauthorized immigration. See N.M. Exec. Order 
No. 2005-o40 (Aug. 12, 2005), ovailable at http://www.governor.state.nm.us/press/zoos/au-
gust/o81205_1.pdf; State of Ariz., Declaration of Emergency, Arizona-Mexico International 
Border Security Emergency (Aug. 15 , 2005), ovailable at http://azgovernor.gov/dms/upload/ 
DE-o8t6os-AZMEXBorderSecurity.pdf. 
63 See Johnson, supra note 1 o, at 201 -o3 (discussing and refuting these common concerns 
about open borders); Pecoud & Guchteneire, supra note 10 (noting little empirical support for 
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to the original idea of sovereignty and the na_rion 's ability to protect and 
preserve itself against external threats. 
National security has been a focus of U.S. immigration law since the 
Alien Act of 1798.64 It is directly reflected in the law in various grounds of 
inadmissibility and removability.65 The inadmissibility grounds exclude, in 
broad language, noncitizens who: seek to engage or engage in espionage, 
sabotage or "any other unlawful activity"; participate in, incite or otherwise 
support terrorist activity or organizations; may cause "potentially serious 
adverse foreign policy consequences;'; have been or are members of the 
Communist Party or any other totalitarian party; or participated in Nazi 
persecution, genocide, torture or extrajudicial killing. 66 The grounds for 
removability, -chough somewhat narrower, are similar in many respects 
' 
and identical in others.67 Moreover, the immigration reform efforts of the 
last decade including both the 1996 changes in the law and the changes 
since September 11, 2001 have often been motivated, at least in part, by 
national security concerns and supported by such rhetoric.68 
Nonetheless, national security is not the only or even necessarily the 
primary rationale for closed borders. 69 Economic and cultural concerns are 
claims that huge migration flows would result from a more open migration po1icy). 
64 "An Act Respecting Alien Enemies." 6th Cong., ( 1798), (J'()tJilable at http://www. yale. 
edu/lawweb/ava]on/statutes/alien.htm) (last visited Oct. s,. 2007). 
65 See INA, 8 U.S.C. § I 182(a)(3) (2ooo) (national security related grounds of inadmis-
sibility); 8 U.S.C. § 1 227(a)(4) (2ooo) (national security related grounds of deportability). 
66 8 U.S.C. § I I 82(a)(3). 
67 8 U.S.C. § 1 227(a)(4) (listing security related grounds of deportability, including seek-
ing to engage or engaging in espionage, sabotage or "any other criminal activity which endan ... 
gers public safecy or national security;" participating in, inciting or otherwise supporting ter-
rorist activity or organizations or receiving military-type training_ from a terrorist organization; 
other activities that may cause potentiaJiy serious adverse foreign policy consequences; or 
participation in Nazi persecution, genocide, torture or extra-judicial killing or severe viola-
tions of religious freedom). 
68 For example, both AEDPA and IIRIRA were enacted in the wake of, and motivated 
in part by, the 1994 Oklahoma City bombing and the original World Trade Center bombing 
in 1993. See, e.g., AEDPA, Pub. L. No. 104-132, 110 Stat. 1214 (1996) (enacted to "deter 
terrorism, provide justice for victimst provide for an effective death penalty, and for other 
purposes';). More recently, that has been particularly true of both the PATRIOT Act and 
REAL ID. See Uniting and Strengthening America by Providing Appropriate Tools Required 
to Intercept and Obstruct Terrorism (USA PATRIOT) Act of 2001, Pub. L. No. 107-56, I 15 
Stat. 272 (2001); REAL 10 Act of 2005, Pub. L~ No. 109-13, 119 Stat. 231 (2005); Statement 
of the Honorable Michael Chertoff, Secretary, U.S. Department of Homeland Security Before 
the United States judiciary Comm.ictee, (Feb. 28, 2007), available at http://www.dhs.gov/ 
xnews/testimony/testimony_I I728S350·I273·shtm ("First, and most important, immigration 
reform should ensure that we maintain effective safeguards preventing terrorists from taking 
advantage of our tradition of welcoming immigrants of all nations"). 
. . 
69 In fact, even some proponents of enforcement-based immigration reform have as-
serted that national security may be better served by more open immigration and cross-bor~ 
der collaboration. See Remarks by Homeland Security Secretary Michael Chertoff on Secure 
Borders and Open Doors in the Information Age, (Jan. 17, 2006), available at http://www.dhs. 
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also paramount. Regular d,ebate appears in the popular press and in academic 
scholarship about the economic and cultural impact of immigration. 7° Fears 
about the econontic burden caused by immigrants or the economic impact 
of immigration on citizens run through current immigration law: there are 
economic-based grounds of inadmissibility and removability;71 immigrants 
are prohibited from receiving most forms of public benefits and assistance;72 
and immigrant lab-or is permitted generally only when it will not have an 
adverse impact on U.S. workers.73 Until fairly recently, cultural concerns 
were also manifest in the immigration laws. Cultural concerns were often 
mediated through the language of race as in the Asian exclusion laws 
or other limits that persisted until the 1950s.74 Although less explicit in 
the law today, apprehensions about cultural impact remain evident in 
the numerical caps on immigration, including the per country limits that 
gov/xnews/speeches/speech_o266.shtm ("But as we continue to work to maintain our immi-
gration laws and to upgrade our security, our heritage, our national character, our economic 
interests, even our national security interests, require us to continue to promote a welcoming 
process for those who lawfully cross our borders to work, learn and visit"). 
70 See,. e.g., Douglas S. Massey, Five Myths About Immigration: Common Misconceptions 
Underlying U.S. Border-Enforcentent Policy, 4 IMMIGR . . PoCy IN Focus 6 (Aug. 2005), available 
.at http://www.ailf.org/ipc/infocus/2oos._fivemyths.pdf; johnson, supra note 10, at 233-40 (eco-
nomic impact), 257~58 (cultural impact); see gmera/Jy, Migration Information Source, U.S. in 
Focus, http://www.migrationinformation.org/USfocus/ (listing numerous articles on the irrt.pact 
of immigration in the United States). Cf, Center for Immigration Studies, Costs of Immigration, 
http:l/www.cis.org/topics/costs.html (listing publications on costs of immigration). 
71 See INA., 8 U.S.C. § 1 182(a)(4) (2ooo) (economic related grounds of inadmissibility); 8 
U.S.C. § 1227(a)(5) (economic related grounds of deponability). 
72 8 U.S.C. § 1227(a)(5) (2ooo); see also Personal Responsibility and Work Opportunity 
Reconciliation Act of 1996, Pub. L. No. 104-193, 110 Stat. 2105 ( 1996) (codified in various 
sections of 8 U.S.C.) (welfare reforms making immigrants, including permanent residents and 
undocumented immigrants, ineligible for most forms. of public assistance). 
73 See INA, 8 U.S.C. § 1152. (2ooo) (describing per country limits); 8 U.S.C. § 1 153(c) 
(2000) (describing diversity visa lottery); 8 U.S.C. § 1 182(a)(5) (describing labor certification 
process that is intended to prevent displacement of U.S. workers and avoid adverse impact on 
working conditions of U.S. workers). 
74 See Gabriel J. Chin, The Civil Rights Revolution Comes to Immigration Law: A New Look 
at the Immigration and Nationality Act of 1965, 75 N.C. L. REv. 273, ~7<)-88 (1996) (tracing the 
history of the Asian exclusion laws through their formal removal in 1952 and lingering impact 
until 1965). 
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serve to restrict immigration from the high demand countries of Central 
America, 75 and the structures of the ''diversity" lottery. 76 
Grounded in the idea of sovereignty and the sovereign power to 
exclude, this constellation of fears and concerns about immigration has 
gradually dominated U.S. immigration law and policy. The focus has 
become increasingly about putting limitations on immigration, and the 
goal has become tightening or even closing the U.S. borders. However, 
this is not necessarily an inevitable or even a wise policy, as is becoming 
increasingly clear. Growing frustration with this failed policy of closure has 
led to renewed calls for a more balanced approach to crafting immigration 
policy.77 Fortunately, and interestingly, the same underpinning of 
sovereignty under international law that has justified and reinforced the 
closed border approach also presents the possibility of a radically different 
approach that emphasizes loosening restrictions or opening the borders. 
II. OPEN BORDERS: RIGHTS, RATIONALITY AND RESOURCES 
Sovereignty in international law is, of course, fundamentally connected to 
both territorial integrity and principles of national autonomy.78 However, 
the international meaning and understanding of these ideas has evolved 
since the 1880s and the era of the Chinese Exclusion Case. With the rise 
of the modern human rights movement79 and the challenges, and often 
75 Section 202 of the INA sets per-country limits of 7%, with some exceptions for the co-
tal annual family-sponsored and employment-based immigration preference Jimits. 8 U.S.C. 
§ 1 152(a)(2). This results in a significant backlog in processing cases from high-demand coun-
tries, such as Mexico. The current U.S. State Department Visa Bulletin lists the wait times for 
family-sponsored visas for Mexico ranging from approximately 6 to 19 years, depending on 
category, and for employment-based visas ranging from current (immediately available) to 6 
years, again depending on category. U.S. DEPT. ST. BuLL. No. 104, Vol. VIII (Apr. 2007), ovail-
able at h ttp://travel.state.gov/visa/frvi/bulletin/bulletin_J 1 69.html. 
76 See supra notes 43-50 and accompanying text; see also Stephen H. Legomsky, 
Immigration, Equality, and Diversity, 31 CoLUM. J. TRANSNAT'L L. 319 (1993). 
77 In the spring of 2006, hundreds of thousands, if not millions, of immigrants and their 
supporters took to the streets across the country to protest current U.S. immigration policy 
and to express concerns about proposed legislation that would further "toughen'' existing 
laws. See, e.g., Yvonne Wingett & Daniel Gonzalez, Immigrants Protest in Valley, Cities Across 
U.S., ARiz. REPUBLIC, Mar. 28, 2006, ovailable at http://www.azcentral.com/arizonarepublic/ 
news/articles/0327peoplemarch.html (estimating 20,000 protesters in Phoenix, half a million 
in Los Angeles, and over 1oo,ooo in Chicago); Maria Newman, Immigration Advocates Rally 
Across U.S., N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 10, 2006 (describing marches in New York City and elsewhere 
across the country). 
78 See supra notes J 8-3 7 and accompanying text (describing contours of sovereignty in 
international law). 
79 International human rights law is essentially a modern, post-World War II phe-
nomenon. Richard B. Bilder, An Overview of International Human Rigltts l.aw, in GuiDE TO 
INTERNATIONAL HUMAN RIGHTS PRACTICE 3-18 (Hurst Hannum ed., 3d ed. 1999); CASSESE, 
supra note 20, at 104 . 
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violence, of the end of colonialism and the break-up ofthe.Soviet Union and 
former Yugoslavia80 the dominance of sovereignty and territorial integrity 
has eroded to accommodate the rights of both individuals and "peoples" 
within and outside of states.81 These rights include individual and group 
rights to self-determination,82 freedom of movement,83 and freedom 
from discrimination. 84 An evolved understanding of sovereignty and its 
relationship to individual human rights should inform, and transform, the 
domestic view of immigration law in the United States. More open borders 
would reflect a rational policy balance between protecting individual 
rights and respecting sovereign powers to control territory and national 
membership. 
So See generally Margaret Moore, The Tenitorial Dimension of Self-Determination, in 
NATIONAL SELF-DETERMINATION AND SECESSION 134-57 (Margaret Moore ed., 1998) (dis-
cussing claims of self-determination in the contexts of former Yugoslavia and in Quebec); 
Michael McFaul, The Sovereignty Script, Red Book for Russian Revolutionaries, in PROBLEMATIC 
SovEREIGNTY: CoNTESTED RuLES AND PoLITICAL PosSIBILITIES 194 (Stephen D. Krasner ed., 
2001) (describing aspects of the break-up of the Soviet Union). 
81 CASSESE, supra note 20, at 104 (describing human rights as "competing if not at 
loggerheads with the traditional principles of respect for the sovereign equality of States 
and of non-interference in the domestic affairs of other States"); see Louis Henkin, That 44S" 
Word: Sovereignty, and Globalization, and Human Rights, EtCetera, 68 FoRDHAM L. REv. 1, 3-4 
( 1 999); see also Thomas Kleven, Why International Law F Of.Jors Emigration Over Immigration, 33 
U. MIAMI INTER-AM. L. REv. 69, 71-72 (2002); Juss, supra note 19, at 321-22 ("sovereignty has 
never been weaker"). 
82 Self-determination is expressed as a fundamental human right in both the International 
Covenant on Civil and Political Rights and the International Covenant on Economic, Social 
and Cultural Rights. International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, art. 1 ( 1 ), Dec. 
19, 1966, 999 U.N.T.S. 171 (entered into force Mar. 23, 1976) OtJailable at http://www.ohchr. 
org/english/law/ccpr.htrn [hereinafter ICCPRJ; International Covenant on Economic, Social 
and Cultural Rights, art. 1(1), Dec. 16, 1966,993 U.N.T.S. 3 (entered into force jan. 3, 1976) 
available at http://www.ohchr.org/english/law/cescr.htm [hereinafter ICESCR]. It is also ar-
ticulated in the United Nations Charter. U.N. CHARTER art. 1, para. 2 (entered into force, Oct. 
24, 1945). 
83 Rights of freedom of movement are provided in the Universal Declaration of Human 
Rights and the ICCPR. Universal Declaration of Human Rights art. 13-15, G.A. Res. 217A 
(III) (Dec. 10, 1948), Of.Jailable at http://www.unhchr.ch/udhr/lang/eng.pdf (last visited Oct. 5, 
2007) [hereinafter Universal Declaration]; ICCPR,supra note 82, art. 12-13. 
84 Principles of equality and non-discrimination are threaded throughout the major in-
ternational human rights documents. See, e.g., ICCPR, supra note 82, art. 2; ICESCR, supra 
note 82, art. 2; Universal Declaration, supra note 83, art. 1-2. 
Other human rights, such as the right to political participation and the right to work, are 
also relevant to the relationship between sovereignty and national borders. See Pecoud & 
Guchteneire,supra note 10, at 15-16. These rights are also reflected in the major international 
human rights instruments discussed infra. 
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A. International Law Support for Open Borders 
Sovereignty continues to be a bedrock principle of international law; yet the 
state-centric focus of sovereignty has now been balanced at the international 
level by increased consideration of the individual.85 The development of 
international human rights law has been most fundamental in shifting 
the balance in this direction.86 States are still the primary actors on the 
international level both in developing and in implementing international 
law, including international human rights law.87 Furthermore, states are still 
given tremendous latitude in how they arrange their domestic affairs and in 
how they treat both their citizens and those subject to their jurisdiction and 
control.88 However, sovereignty is not without limits, particularly when there 
is a countervailing individual or group rights interest.89 Under international 
85 CASSESE, supra note 20, at 104. 
86 The protection of internationally recognized human rights has been a basic purpose of 
the United Nations since its founding in 1945. U.N. Charter art. 1 para. 3 (entered into force, 
Oct. 24, 1945). In 1946, the U.N. General Assembly established a Commission on Human 
Rights, and in I948 it adopted the Universal Declaration. The United Nations and its mem-
ber states have recently engaged in effons to reform the U.N.'s existing human rights mecha-
nisms by creating a new Human Rights Council. See \Varren Hoge, lVith Its Human Rights 
Oversight Under Fire, U.N. Submits a Plan fora Strengthened Agency, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 3, 2006, at 
A6 (describing plan for new Council). 
87 There are international mechanisms to monitor States' compliance with international 
human rights obligations both "treaty bodies" such as the Human Rights Committee (creat-
ed to monitor compliance with the ICCPR) and non-treaty bodies such as the Human Rights 
Commission (a subsidiary body of the United Nations to monitor general compliance with 
international human rights obligations). However, these international mechanisms are gener-
ally considered to be avenues of last resort. See, e.g., ICCPR, supra note 82, art. 41 (c) (requiring 
exhaustion of all available domestic remedies before the Committee will consider a matter); 
see also joan Fitzpatrick, The Role of Domestic Courts in Enforcing International Human Rights Law, 
in GuiDE To INTERNATIONAL HuMAN RIGHTS PRACTICE 247, 247-68 (Hurst Hannum ed., 3d ed. 
1999) (describing the primacy of national mechanisms in protecting human rights). There 
is a presumption in favor of resolving problems at the national level relying on national 
governments to set up their domestic systems to protect human rights, provide remedies for 
violations and generally implement international human rights obligations. The role of the 
international mechanisms is primarily to establish and develop normative standards. 
88 International human rights tribunals generally give some deference to national gov-
ernments in defining the content and scope of human rights protection domestically. This 
is often referred to as the "margin of appreciation" doctrine. See, e.g., George Letsas, Two 
Concepts of the Margin of Appreciation, 26 OxFORD j. LEGAL STUD. 705 (2006) (discussing his-
tory and uses of the doctrine of margin of appreciation); Paul Mahoney, Maroelous Richness 
of Diversity or Invidious Cultural Relativism, 19 HuM. RTs. L. J. I, I-2 (I998) (discussing the 
principle of subsidiarity and the margin of appreciation). 
The common language of undertaking in human rights treaties requires a state party 
to respect and ensure the rights of "all individuals within its territory and subject to its 
jurisdiction." See ICCPR, supra note 82, art. 2( 1 ); ICESCR, supra note 82, art. 2(1 ). 
89 CASSESE, supra note 20, at 104-o8 (discussing the limits imposed on sovereignty by 
principles of human rights and self-determination). 
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law, states that have undertaken human rights obligations, either by treaty90 
or under customary internationallaw,91 have a responsibility to respect and 
ensure those rights.92 International law operates pri-marily as a voluntary 
"consent regime," however these obligations are binding on s-tates once 
they are undertaken.93 Although the United States: is party to few of the 
major international human rights treaties namely, the International 
Covenant on Civil and Political Rights and the-Convention against Torture 
and Other Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or Punishment - it has 
generally assumed a leadership role in seeking to advance protection of 
human rights at the_ international level.94 The United States' leadership 
90 The three major instruments of the "International Bill of Rights" are the Universal 
Declaration; the ICCPR, and the ICESCR. See Universal Declaration; supra note 83; ICCPR; 
supra note 82; and ICESCR, supra note 82. The Universal Declaration is not a binding treaty, 
but some scholars believe it has achieved the: status of binding customary international law. 
See, e.g., Louis Sohn, The New International Law: Protection of the Rights oflndividuals Rather than 
States, 32 AM. U. L. REv. 1, 16-17, .20 ( 1982). The Covenants are both binding treaties; and the 
United Scates is party to the ICCPR, among others. 
91 Customary international law is also binding on states. See RESTATEMENT (ThiRD) OF 
FoREIGN RELATIONS LAW OF THE UNITED STATES § 102 ( 1987) (identifying sources of inter-
national law, including customary international law). In the context of international human 
rights, there is a limited set of rights violations that constitute violations of customary inter-
national law. See id. § 702. 
92 For example, _the general language of obligation in the ICCPR provides: 
Each State Party to the presen~ Covenant undertakes to respect and to 
ensure to all individuals within its territory and subjec_t to its jurisdiction 
the rights recognized in the present Covenant, without distinction of 
any kind, such as race, colour, sex, language, religion, political or other 
opinion, national or social origin, property, birth or other status. 
ICCPR, supra note 82, art. 2( 1 ). 
93 See supra notes 9<>-91 (discussing the language of general undertaking). See 
also Thomas C. Heller & Abraham D. Sofaer, Sovereignty, The Practitioners' Perspective, in 
PRoBLEMATIC SovEREIGNTY: CoNTESTED RuLES AND PoLITICAL PosSIBILITIES 31-33 (Stephen 
D. Krasner ed., 2001) (describing these international commitments as the exercise of sover-
eignty, rather than limitations upon sovereignty); Harold Hongju Koh, Why Do Nations Obey 
International Law?, 106 YALE L.J. 2599,2645-46 (1997) (discussing the theory that in~ernalized 
compliance and obedience increase comportment with international law). Koh identifies the 
process as Transnational Legal Process (TLP), which "promotes the interaction, interpreta-
tion, and internalization of international legal norms." ld. at 2603. Koh distinguishes social, 
political, and legal internalization of norms, including_ explicit and implicit judicial internaliza-
tion. I d. at 2656-57. Ryan Goodman and Derek Jinks also discuss coercion, persuasion, and 
acculturation as methods for ensuring compliance with international human rights law. Ryan 
Goodman & Derek Jinks, How to lnjlue.nce. States: Socialization and International Human Rights 
Law, 54 DuKE L.J. 621, 623 (2004). 
94 The United States and the other victorious allied nations played a foundational role 
in the development of both the substantive components of international human rights law 
and the international monitoring mechanisms. See joHN P. HUMPHREY, HUMAN RIGHTS AND 
THE UNITED NATIONS: A GREAT ADVENTURE, 31-33, 42-43 (1984); John P. Humphrey, The 
Universal Declaration of Human Rights: Its History, Impact and Juridical Ch(lracter, in HUMAN 
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role has not, however, translated into increased protection of human rights 
in the context of domestic immigration law. 
In the context of immigration and border control; many internationally-
recognized human rights are implicated, including the rights to self-
determination, freedom of movement, and freedom from discrimination.95 
However, in light of the close linkage between sovereignty and border 
control, this connection to human rights is seldom raised or discussed in the 
context of national policy discourse.% The contours and nuances of each 
of these rights would merit a fuller discussion than this article will provide; 
however, a summary review is sufficient to illustrate their transformative 
potential to radically rebalance U.S. immigration law and policy. 97 
The right to self-determination is both fundamental and deeply 
contested as a matter of international law. On the one hand, it has 
underpinned the idea of national independence and sovereignty since 
the days of the American and French Revolutions.98 Over time, self-
RIGHTS: ThiRTY YEARS AFTER THE UNIVERSAL DECLARATION 21-37 (B.G. Ramcharan ed., 1979). 
The U.S. became a party to the ICCPR in 1992 and to the Convention against Torture and 
Other Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or Punishment in 1994; the U.S. has ·asserted 
• 
various reservations to both treaties. U.S. Reservations, Understandings, and Declarations, 
ICCPR, 138 CoNG. REc. S8o68 (daily ed. Apr. 2, 1992) (U.S. adherence effective Sept. 8, 
1992); Convention Against Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or 
Punishment, 136 CoNG. REc. S36192-36194 (1990) (U.S. adherence effective Nov. 20, 1994). 
95 See David Cole, Tire Idea of Humanity: Human Rights and Immigrants' Rights, 37 CoLUM. 
HuM. RTs. L. REv. 627, 627 (2006) ("Because they are predicated on one's status as a human 
being, rather than on one's affiliation with any particular nation-state, international human 
rights are both most relevant to, and most tested by, the treatment of foreign nationals"). But 
se~ Hiroshi Motomura, Federalism, International Human Rights, and Immigration Exceptionalism, 
70 U. CoLO. L. REv. 1361, 1363-64 (1999) (identifying the potential limitations of a human 
rights approach to immigration matters). 
96 There has been more discussion in legal scholarship, however. See, e.g., Ahcene 
Boulesbaa, A Comparative Study Between the International Law and tlr~ United States Supreme 
Court Standards for Equal and Human Rights in tire Treatment of Aliens, 4 GEo. IMMIGR. L.j. 445 
(1990); David Cole, The Idea of Humanity: Human Rights and Immigrants' Rights, 37 CoLUM. 
HuM. RTs. L. REv. 627, 627 (2006); joan Fitzpatrick & William Mckay Bennett, A Lion in the 
Path? The Influence of International Law on the Immigration Policy of the United States, 70 WASH. 
L. REV. 589 ( 1995); Berta Esperanza Hernandez-Truyol, Natives, Newcomers and Nativism: A 
Human Rights Mode/for the Twenty-First Century, 23 FoRDHAM URB. L.j. 1075 (I996);JamesA.R. 
Nafziger, Tire General Admission of Aliens Under International Low, 77 AM. J. INT;L L. 804 (1983); 
Hiroshi Motomura, Federalism, International Human Rights, and Immigration Exceptionalism, 70 
u. COLO. L. REV. 1361 (1999). 
97 This article does not address or consider the many complex and interesting issues 
related to the incorporation of international law into the domestic legal system nor the many 
possible uses of international law in the domestic context. Instead, it limits itself to suggest-
ing that meaningful consideration of the principles, policy goals, and theoretical develop-
ments reflected in international human rights law would advance the development of domes-
tic immigration law. 
98 CASSESE, supra note 20, at 105 (tracing the history from the French Revolution); Daniel 
Philpott, Self-Detenninotion in Practice, in NATIONAL SELF-DETERMINATION AND SECESSION 
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determination. the idea of the consent of the governed in any sovereign 
state has become the standard for judging the legitimacy of the exercise of 
sovereign power.99 The two major human rights treaties the International 
Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (ICCPR) and the International 
Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rig_hts (ICESCR) address the 
right of self-determination in expansive terms and in a place of primacy. 100 
In identical language, both Article 1 of the ICESCR and Article 1 of the 
ICCPR state, "All peoples have the right of self-determination. By virtue 
of that right they freely determine their political status and freely pursue 
their economic, social and cultural development." 101 Although the right of 
self-determination serves in part to justify sovereignty and the territorial 
integrity of states, it is also constrained by those ideas. 102 Nonetheless, when 
the right of self-determination is exercised as the right of a "people,'' rather 
.. 
than an existing nation, there is the~ potential to disrupt the sovereignty of 
an existing nation-state. 103 
8o (Margaret Moore ed., 1998) (noting the origins of selfi..determination in the American 
Revolution, colonial independence movements and the theories of liberal democracy). 
-99 CASsESE, supra note 20, at 105-o7. Self~etermination ''requires a free and genu-
ine expression of the will of the peoples concerned." Western Sahara, Advisory Opinion, 
1975 I.C.j. 12, 32, 33 (Oct. 16). See also HILARY CHARLESWORTH & CHRISTINE CHINKIN, ThE 
BouNDARIES OF INTERNATIONAL LAw: A FEMINIST ANALYSIS 151 (2000) (noting that "a sovereign 
state is in theory built on the self-determination of its population in the sense _chat the people 
should determine the way that :government is organised"). 
100 This linkage of the: right to self-determination to the entire spectrum of rights re-
flected in the two Covenants underscores its importance in international law. CHARLESWORTH 
& CHINKIN, supra note 99, at 152. 
101 ICCPR,supra note 82t art. 1(1); ICESCR,supra note 82, art~ 1(1). The remainder of 
shared Article 1 reads: 
2. All peoples may, for their own ends, freely dispose of their natural 
wealth and resources without prejudice to any obligations arising out of 
international economic cooperation, based upon the principle of mutual 
benefit, and international law. In no case may a people be deprived of 
its own means of subsistence. 
3• The States Parties to the present Covenant, including those having 
responsibility for the administration of Non-Self-Governing and Trust 
Territories, shall promote the realization of the right of self-determina-
tion, and shall respect that right, in conformity with the provisions of the 
Chatter of the United Nations. 
ld. The United Nations. Charter also refers to resp,ect for self-determination as one-of its 
. 
purposes. Article 1 of the Charter states that. "(t]he Purposes of the United Nations are: ... To 
develop friendly relations among nations based on respect for the principle of equal rights and 
self-determination of peoples, and to take other appropriate measure to strengthen peace." 
U.N. Charter art. 1, para. 2 (entered into force, Oct. 24; 1945). 
102 CASsESE, supra note 20, at 10lH>8; Philpott, supra note 98, at 86 ("[s]elf-determina-
tion has long lingered in the shadow of state sovereignty"). 
103 CASSESE, supra note 20, at 106-107. This was dramatically illustrated with the break-
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Thus, the right of self-determination is usually least controversial when 
it is exercised as an individual right, within the confines of an existing nation-
state. 104 However, even when the right of self-determination is exercised 
as an individual right, it has the potential to have a significant impact on 
national sovereignty if the individual seeks to pursue his or her political 
rights or economic, social and cultural development in a nation other than 
the one of his or her citizenship. 105 Typically, the exercise of individual 
human rights is not limited to the country of one's citizenship; in fact, a 
state has the obligation to protect to the human rights of those ''subject to 
its jurisdiction," not just its citizens. 106 In this view, the recognition of the 
right to self-determination has not stopped, and arguably should not stop, 
at national borders. 
The principles underlying the rights to freedom of movement and 
freedom from discrimination have similar transformative potential. The 
right to freedom of movement and important related rights are articulated 
in the major international human rights instruments. The Universal 
Declaration of H urn an Rights 107 includes the right to "freedom of movement 
and residence within the borders of each State" and the right to "leave 
up of former Yugoslavia, for example. See, e.g., Bartram S. Brown, Human Rights, Sovereignty, and 
the Final Status of Kosovo, 8o CHt.-KENT L. REv. 235 (2005); Philpott, supra note 98, at 79· 
104 CASSESE, supra note 20, at 107; see Paul R. Williams & Fancesca Jannotti Pecci, 
Earned Sovereignty: Bridging the Gap between S()Vef'tignty and Self-Detennination, 40 STAN. J. 
INT'L L. 347, 352-53 (2004) (distinguishing "sovereignty first" and "self-determination first" 
models of self-determination); see also Declaration on the Rights of Persons Belonging to 
National or Ethnic, Religious and Linguistic Minorities, G.A. Res. 47/135, Annex, U.N. Doc. 
A/Res/47/135/Annex (Dec. 18, 1992), article 8(4) (clarifying that "(n]othing in the present 
Declaration may be construed as permitting any activity contrary to the purposes and prin-
ciples of the United Nations, including sovereign equality, territorial integrity and political 
independence of States"). 
105 See Francis Gabor & John B. Rosenquest, IV, The Uns~llltd Sta/tls of Economic Refugees 
from the American and International Legal Perspectives A Proposal for Recognition under Existing 
International Law, 41 TEx. INT'L L.j. 275 (zoo6) (proposing individual self-determination as a 
support for recognition of freedom of movement). 
1 o6 See supra note 1 oo (noting that the common language of obligation in human rights 
treaties requires a State Party to respect and ensure the rights of "all individuals within its 
territory and subject to its jurisdiction"). See ICCPR, supra note 82, art. 2(1) ("Each State 
Party to the present Covenant undertakes to respect and to ensure to all individuals within its 
territory and subject to its jurisdiction the rights recognized in the present Covenant .... "); 
cf. ICESCR, supra note 82, art. 2(1) ("Each State Party to the present Covenant undertakes 
to take steps, individually and through international assistance and co-operation, especially 
economic and technical, to the maximum of its available resources, with a view to achieving 
progressively the full realization of the rights recognized in the present Covenant by all ap-
propriate means, including particularly the adoption of legislative measures"). 
107 The Universal Declaration is a consensus declaration of the United Nations General 
Assembly; it is not a binding treaty. However, some scholars believe that it has attained the 
status of binding customary international law. See supra note 83. 
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any country, including [one's] own, and to return." 108 It also recognizes 
the right to a nationality109 and to seek asylum from persecution. 110 These 
rights are also recognized in more limited form in the ICCPR as the right 
to "liberty of movement" and to choose a residence when one is already 
lawfully within a territory. 111 The cautious framing of these rights and the 
limitations upon them reflect the tension between respect for sovereignty 
and for individual rights and the continuing dominance of sovereignty 
in the area of immigration.112 Although international human rights law has 
not explicitly recognized complete freedom of movement across national 
borders or a right to the citizenship of one's choosing, the law may be 
moving in that direction. 113 When freedom of movement is considered 
together with the right to individual self-determination and freedom 
from discrimination, it arguably should. Full recognition of the right to 
free movement in this manner would similarly require a fundamental 
reconsideration of U.S. immigration law and its static notion of sovereignty 
and the power to exclude. 
108 Universal Declaration, supra note 83, art. 13. 
109 /d. at art. 1 s. 
1 10 /d. at art. 14. Article 14 of the Universal Declaration also states "(t]his right may not 
be invoked in the case of prosecutions genuinely arising from non-political crimes or from 
acts contrary to the purposes and principles of the United Nations." /d. This right has been 
. . 
specifically recognized in the U.S. immigration law provisions regarding asylum. See, e.g., INA, 
8 U.S.C. § 1157 (2007) (asylum procedure); 8 U.S.C. § 1158 (2000) (definition of refugee); 8 
U.S.C. § I 101(a)(42) (2000). 
1 1 1 Article 12 provides: 
1. Everyone lawfully within the territory of a State shall, within that 
territory, have the right to liberty of movement and freedom to choose 
his residence. 
2. Everyone shall be free to leave any country, including his own. 
3· The above-mentioned rights shall not be subject to any restrictions 
except those which are provided by law, are necessary to protect national 
security, public order (ordre public), public health or morals or the. 
rights and freedoms of others, and are consistent with the other rights 
recognized in the present Covenant. 
4· No one shall be arbitrarily deprived of the right to enter his own 
country. 
ICCPR, supra note 82, art. 12. Article 13 addresses the rights of noncitizens in case of expulsion 
when lawfully present in a country other than the country of citizenship. !d. at art. 13. 
112 They also reflect the. views of sovereignty contemporaneous to their adoption 1948 
for the Universal Declaration and the 1966 for the ICCPR. Universal Declaration, supra note 
83; ICCPR, supra note 82. 
113 There is an asymmetry in the current understanding of the right to freedom of move-
ment: there is full recognition of a right to emigrate, or leave one's country, and only limited 
recognition of a right to immigration, to enter another country. See Juss, supra note 19, at 289; 
Kleven, supra note 81, at 69. But see Pecoud & Guchteneire, supra note 1 o .. 
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In the context of nondiscrimination, the balance between sovereignty 
and individual rights shifts more dramatically in the direction of protection 
of human rights. The right to be free from discrimination is stated in 
expansive terms in the Universal Declaration of Human Rights, the ICCPR 
and the ICESCR. 114 The Universal Declaration of Human Rights proclaims 
in its first article that "[a]ll human beings are born free and equal in dignity 
and rights." 115 It expands upon that general principle by clarifying that 
discrimination on a broad array of grounds is not permitted. "Everyone is 
entitled to all the rights and freedoms set forth in this Declaration, without 
distinction of any kind, such as race, colour, sex, language, religion, political 
or other opinion, national or social origin, property, birth or other status." 116 
The major human rights Covenants include identical language. 117 This 
principle of nondiscrimination is also incorporated in the major regional 
human rights treaties, 118 and two particular forms of discrimination racial 
discrimination and discrimination against women are the subjects of 
separate international conventions.119 Although citizenship status is not 
114 Collectively, these documents are often referred to as the International Bill of Rights. 
United Nations Office of the High Commissioner for Human Rights, Fact Sheet No. 2 (Rev. 
1), The International Bill of Rights (June 1996), OfJailable at http://\\'Vlw.unhchr.ch/html/ 
menu6/2/fs2.hun (last visited Oct. 13, 2007). 
115 Universal Declaration, supra note 83, art. 1. 
116 !d. at art. 2. 
1 I 7 Article 2 of the ICESCR provides: "The States Parties to che present Covenant un-
dertake to guarantee that the rights enunciated in the present Covenant will be exercised 
without discrimination of any kind as co race, colour, sex, language, religion, political or other 
opinion, national or social origin, property, birth or other status." ICESCR, supra note 82, art. 
2. Article 2 of the ICCPR states, "Each State Party co the present Covenant undenakes to 
respect and to ensure to all individuals within its territory ... the rights recognized in the pres-
ent Covenant, without distinction of any kind ... " ICCPR, supra note 82, art. 2. See supra note 
85 (discussing similar provisions in the U.N. Chaner). 
118 African Charter on Human and Peoples' Rights art. 2, June 27, 1981,21 I.L.M. 58 
( 1982) (prohibiting distinction based on "race, ethnic group, colour, sex, language, religion, po-
litical or any other opinion, national and social origin, fortune, birth or other status"); American 
Convention on Human Rights art. 1, july 18, 1978, 1144 U.N.T.S. 123 (prohibiting discrimi .. 
nation based on "race, color, sex, language, religion, political or other opinion, national or so-
cial origin, economic status, birth, or any other social condition"); European Convention for 
the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms art. 14, Apr. 11, 1950, C.E.T.S. 
oos available at http://conventions.coe.int(freacy/en(Treaties/Html/oos.hcm (prohibiting dis-
crimination on "any ground, such as sex, race, colour, language, religion, political or other 
opinion, national or social origin, association with a national minority, property, birth or other 
status"); see also Cairo Declaration on Human Rights in Islam art. I(a), Aug. s, 1990, O.I.C. 
Res. No. 49/1 9--P ( 1990) OfJailable at http://www.religlaw.org/interdocs/docs/cairohrislam 1990. 
htm (stating that "(a]ll men are equal in terms of basic human dignity and basic obligations 
and responsibilities, without any discrimination on the grounds of race, colour, language, sex, 
or other considerations"). 
1 19 International Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Racial Discrimination 
G.A. Res. 2106 (XX) (entered into force Jan. 4, 1969), ratified by the United States (en-
tered into force Nov. 20, 1994); Declaration on the Elimination of All Forms of Intolerance 
• 
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specifically mentioned, discrimination based on race, color, national or social 
origin is explicitly prohibited. 120 Such discrimination often overlaps or is 
conflated with discrimination against immigrants.121 In addition, much of 
the general treaty language prohibits discrimination on undefined "other" 
grounds as well. 122 Despite this comprehensive ban on discrimination 
based on individual characteristics, differential treatment of citizens 
and noncitizens has largely been accepted without examination based 
on an expansive view of sovereignty.123 However, the equally expansive 
prohibition on discrimination that is recognized in international law a 
prohibition that continues to expand to include new categories offers 
the potential to challenge this additional form of discrimination based on 
citizenship.124 At a minimum, the global commitment to equal treatment 
requires closer, and ongoing, scrutiny of the distinctions that are made 
between citizens and noncitizens. 
While still far from displacing the dominance of sovereignty, the princi pies 
of self-determination, freedom of movement and nondiscrimination 
have started to constrain unfettered notions of sovereignty as a matter of 
international human rights law. This evolved understanding of sovereignty 
and Discrimination Based on Religion or Belief, G.A. Res. 36/55 (adopted by UN General 
Assembly on Nov. 25, 1981); Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination 
Against Women, available at h ttp://www.un.org/womenwatch/daw/cedaw/text/econven tion. 
htm (entered Into force Sept. 3, 1981 ), not ratified by the United States. 
120 See supra notes 114-17 (providing exemplar treaty language prohibiting discrimina-
tion based on race, color, national or social origin). 
121 The Committee on the Elimination of Racial Discrimination, the treaty body 
. . 
charged with monitoring compliance with the Convention on the Elimination of All Forms 
of Racial Discrimination, has recognized this connection. In 2004, the Committee ad-
opted General Recommendation 30, Discrimination against Non-citizens. Gen. Rec. 30, 
Discrimination Against Non-Citizens, CERD/C/64/Misc.11/rev.3 (Comm. on the Elimination 
of Racial Discrimination Mar. 12, 2004), available at http://www.ohchr.org/english/bodies/ 
cerd/docs/CE RD-GC3o.doc. Although the General Recommendation acknowledges that 
the Convention ''provides for the possibility of differentiating between citizens and non-citi-
zens," it calls on States to avoid using that provision to undermine the general prohibition on 
discrimination. /d. at 191 1-2. 
122 See supra notes 116-22 and accompanying text (prohibitions of discrimination on 
"other status" or "other social condition"). 
123 A notable exception to this treatment is the prohibition of discrimination within the 
European Union. Article 12 of the European Community Treaty prohibits discrimination 
based on nationality (rather than citizenship, as all nationals of Member States are also citizens 
of the Union). Treaty of Amsterdam Amending the Treaty on E,uropean Union, the Treaties 
Establishing the European Communities and Certain Related art. 12, Oct. 2, 1997, 1997 0.]. 
(C 340) 3 available at http://eur-lex.europa.eu/en/treaties/dat/I 1997D/htm/1 1997D.html 
[hereinafter EC Treaty]; see infra notes 133-41 and accompanying text; see also NICOLA Roo ERS 
& RicK ScANNELL, FREE MovEMENT oF PERSONS IN THE ENLARGED EuROPEAN UNION 195-99 
(2005) (discussing principle of nondiscrimination in the context of the European Union). 
124 See johnson, supra note 10, at 215-21 (discussing the racism apparent in current U.S. 
immigration law and policy). 
222 KENTUCKY LAW jOURNAL 
and its relationship to human rights could and should inform the 
domestic view of immigration law in the United States, particularly because 
of the important role of sovereignty in shaping that law and the domestic 
history of expanding rights protection in other areas. 125 However, this 
more nuanced understanding of sovereignty has largely been absent from 
policy debates and legal reform efforts in the United States. While few 
policymakers advocate completely closed borders or a complete absence 
of rights for immigrants or noncitizens, the dominant view expressed has 
focused on increased restrictions on immigration. There are strong, but 
infrequently articulated, arguments for moving in the opposite direction 
of current U.S. policy away from increasing closure of the borders and 
towards open borders all of which are compatible with a more balanced 
recognition of both sovereignty and rights. 
B. Opening the Borders in U.S. Immigration Law 
It is not inevitable, and surely not desirable, that U.S. immigration law and 
policy continue to reflect the sweeping view of sovereignty postulated 
over a century ago without consideration of the benefits and opportunities 
offered by increased rights protection and more open borders. As an initial 
matter, there is the very practical argument that the policies of "closure" 
have fundamentally failed to address the primary concerns that justify 
them, and in fact, the likelihood that such policies have been counter-
productive.126 In fact, more open borders may offer the potential for both 
short-term and long-term national security, economic and cultural benefits 
domestically and globally. Moreover, and perhaps more importantly, the 
emphasis on closed borders is inconsistent with many U.S. national and 
cultural values that embrace individual and group rights, including the 
rights to self-determination, free movement and nondiscrimination. 127 
125 See David Cole, The Idea of Humanity~· Human Rights and Immigrants' Rights, 37 CoLUM. 
HuM. RTs. L. REv. 627, 643 (2006); Juliet Stumpf & Bruce Friedman, Advancing Civil Rights 
Through Immigration Law: One Step Forward, Two Steps Back?, 6 N.Y.U. J. LEGIS. & Pus. PoL'v 
131, 132-34 (2003); see also Robert Pear & Michael Luo, Senate Votes, 64-31, to Retain Temporary 
~Vorker Program in Immigration Measure, N.Y. TIMES, May 23, 2007, at 20. 
126 The sense that current policies have failed to address policy goals spans the political 
spectrum. Compare, e.g., Massey, supra note 70, at 1, with RoB SoBHANI, UNITED? STATES, OuR 
IMMIGRATION PROBLEM, NATIONAL REVIEW ONLINE (July 9, 2002), http://www.nationalreview. 
com/comment/comment-sobhanio70902.asp. See also Robert Pear, Many Employers See Flaws 
as Immigration Bill Evolves, N.Y. TIMES, May 27, 2007, at 123 (quoting Mr. E. John Krumholtz, 
director of federal affairs at ~1icrosoft, on the proposed immigration reform bill, '"(t]he deal is 
worse than the status quo, and the status quo is a disaster"). 
127 ~1any of these values are reflected in the U.S. Bill of Rights and civil rights legisla-
tion. U.S. CoNsT. amend. XIV (rights to life, liberty, due process and equal protection); U.S. 
CoNST. amend. XIII (abolishing slavery); 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (2ooo) (creating a cause of action 
for "deprivation of any rights, privileges, or immunities secured by the Constitution"). They 
are also reflected in the U.S. ratification of the ICCPR. See supra note 91. See also Johnson, 
2007-2008] BORDER POLICY AND HUMAN RIGHTS 223 
Given the long historical development and many complexities of 
U.S. immigration law, it is difficult co envision what a shift towards open 
borders would look like in detaiL 128 At the outermost end of the spectrum, 
we could imagine a national border comparable to the internal U.S. state 
borders, devoid of any controls or limits on entry and exit.129 Such a policy 
could eliminate any numerical caps, restrictive categories, or grounds for 
exclusion. 130 It could dismantle the large and complex administrative 
and legislative regime set up to deal with both immigration benefits and 
enforcement. 131 However, the policy would not have to go so far, and 
arguably, such an extreme shift would simply risk repeating the policy 
imbalance in the opposite direction and ignore valid concerns that support 
some restrictions or limitations. 132 Is it possible, then, to advance individual 
supra note 10, at 244-58 (discussing incompatibility of immigration enforcement with national 
values). 
128 Kleven suggests "substantial, though not unrestricted, freedom of movement in 
both the emigration and immigration contexts, subject however to a balancing process that 
would also give substantial weight to the interests of others affected thereby and of society 
as a whole[,]" would satisfy liberal ideals. Kleven, supra note 81 , at 83. See also Pecoud & 
Guch tenei re, supra note 1 o, at 1 . 
129 In proposing recognition of a right to free movement as early as 1971, Nett identified 
the United States as a model of an "open system of world migration:" 
Do we have any knowledge of how an open system of world migration 
might work? We have limited cases. One might think of free move-
ment of people within the British system. A clearer example, however, 
is within the United States of America, where people have, and have 
had, the right of free movement since slavery was abolished more than 
a century ago. Here we have a fair-sized experiment to see how free 
movement operates in one instance. It works surprisingly well on one 
subcontinent anyway. When there is a drought in one region, as in the 
dust-bowl days of the 1 930s, people move to another region, and oppor-
tunities are somewhat equalized. When clumsy state officials or dema-
gogues disrupt a school system, teachers move to another state. This has 
a corrective effect on state policies or, if it does not, enriches the states 
which have better policies or more to offer. Imagine what it would be 
like if everybody were kept within the boundaries of his own state, and 
you have a fair picture of most of the rest of the world today! 
Nett, supra note 2, at 219-20. Other models include some of the regional approaches to free 
migration. See Pecoud & Guchteneire, supra note 10, at 2o-22 (describing the European 
Union and other regional examples). 
130 See supra notes 43-59 and accompanying text (describing existing limitations). 
13 I A freer system of migration would not eliminate, of course, the responsibility of mi-
grants to obey local laws; rather, as Nett argues, it would make it easier for them to do so. Nett, 
supra note 2, at 220. For an argument in support of retaining some border controls in the 
European Union context, see }.P.H. Donner, Abolition of Border Controls, in FREE ~1ovEMENT OF 
PERSONS IN EuROPE 5, 6--8 (Henry G. Schermers et al., eds. 1993). 
132 The risks would be particularly high if the U.S. undertook such measures unilaterally 
without considering the impact on neighboring countries and regional impact. See, e.g., Nett, 
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ri_ghts and still account for concerns about national security and economic 
and cuI rural impact? 
Perhaps a better and more easily conceivable model is that provided by 
the European Union. 133 Although there are many aspects of the European 
Union system that are unique and may only be appropriate to that system, 
it offers a tantalizing example in several respects. Firs-t, individuals living 
within the system are considered citizens of both their own nation-states 
and of the European Union. 134 This model presents a new and more open 
conception of citizens_hip, a dual citizens_hip, including both a national 
citizenship and a regional or supranational citizenship~ 135 Broader citizenship 
would extend the relationship beyond individual and nation to encompass 
other nations and their citizens as well. Second, an important feature of the 
European Union system is the freedomofmovement permitted within that 
system. 1j 6 In fact, that freedom of movement to work, to live, to trave)i-
is characterized as an essential aspe-ct of the system. 137 Although there are 
supra note 2, at 221-23 (noting potential problems of "brain-drain,'; short-term instability, an:d 
concerns about national security, employment and cultural compatibility). 
133 The European Union began with six Member States in 1950, with the creation of 
the European Coal and Steel Community. ROGERS & ScANNELL, supra note t 23, at 3-I o (de-
scribing the four founding Treaties of the European Union and the subsequent amending 
treaties). The European Union has since expanded to 25 Member States. ld. at 3· It has its 
own decision-making institutions and law, including human rights law, but also works in the 
broader framework of regional human rights law. /d. at Io-17 (describing the main institutions 
of the European Union), 35-44 (describing relationship between EU law and the European 
Convention on Human Rights). 
134 Article 17 of the European Community Treaty provides, "Citizenship of the Union is 
hereby established. Every p.erson holding the nationality of a member State shall be a citizen 
ofthe Union. Citizenship of the Union shall complement and not replace national citizen--
ship." EC Treaty, supra note I 23, art 17( I) See RoGERS & ScANNELLt supra note I 23, at 45 
. . . 
("The uniqueness and potential enormity of these provisions based on the creation of the 
novel concept of citizenship of a supranational body should be acknowledged"). 
I35 /d. at 45· Scholars have also proposed various models of "global citizenship." See 
Berta Esperanza Hernandez-Troyol & Matthew Hawk, Traveling the Boundaries of Statelessness: 
Global Passpotts and Citizenship, 52 CLEV. ST. L. REv. 97 (zoos); Berta Esperanza Hernandez-
Truyol, Globalized Citizenship: Sovereignty, Security and Soul, so VILL. L. REv. I 009, 1023-35 
(2005); B.S. Chimni, International Institutions Today: An Imperial Global State in the Making, 
15 EuR. j. INT'L L. I, 33 (2004); Linda Bosniak, Multiple Nationality and the Postnotional 
Transformation of Citizenship, 42 VA. j. INT'L L. 979; IOO<H>3 (2002). 
136 Article 18 of the European Community Treaty sets forth this central right, "[e]very 
citizen of the Union shall have the right to move and reside freely within the territory of the 
Member States, subject to the limitations and conditions laid down in this Treaty and by the 
measures adopted to give it effect." EC Treaty, supra note I 23, art. 18( 1 ). 
137 RoGERS & ScANNELL, supra note 123, at 77-78 (describing the gradual extension of 
free movement rights within the EU and suggesting that "any EU citizen should have the 
right to move and reside in the territory of another Member State simply by virtue of being a 
Union citizen"). The_ Eur.op:ean Court of Justice has used principles of human rights to infer 
a right of residence even when not directly conferred by the EC Treaty and secondary legisla-
tion. See Case C:....6o/oo, Carpenterv. Sec'y of State for the Home Dep't, 2002 E.C.R. l-6279, 
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requirements and some limitations attached to the free movement,- i't is 
fundamentally conceived as a freedom to move across borders. 138 Finally, 
the laws regarding movement and migration in the particular nation-states 
of the European Union and within the European Union system exist also 
within the framework of supranational human rights law, particularly the 
regional European human rights system.'39 The human rights ·law of the 
European Union and of the European Convention on Human Rights 
provide context for the development of migration in the region .. 149 Thus, 
the European Union system reflects a model of migration and borders that 
balances national sovereignty with individual rights protection within a 
framework of regional, if not global, cooperation.141 
Short of adopting such a regional model, however, or taking steps in the 
progression to that end, at a minimum, the shift to open borders should 
include a reexamination of the basic aspects of U.S. immigration law and 
policy in light of the countervailing rights at stake. Using individual self~ 
determination, freedom of movement and non-discrimination as guiding 
principles, an open borders approach would mean raising, eliminating or 
adjusting the numerical caps to more accurately reflect demand; it would 
also suggest eliminating the specific immigrant categories or adding an 
unrestricted category of open immigration.14z It would require a reversal 
of the trend towards adding and expanding the grounds of exclusion and 
removal. 143 Finally, it would mean rationalizing the process by shifting 
the presumptions away from exclusion and towards inclusion, as well as 
shifting resources away from enforcement efforts and towards the provision 
of immigration services. 
Such'a shift in perspective, in this case on who may enter the country, is 
not completely unprecedented in U.S. immigration law; it occurred in the 
<JI46; Case C-413/99, Baumbast and R. v. Sec'y of State for the Home Dep't, 2002 E.C.R. 
I-7091, 9[ SD--94; RoGERS & ScANNELL, supra note 123, at 168-69. 
138 EC Treaty, supra note 123, art. 18( 1 ); RoGERS & ScANNELL, supra note 123, at 77-78 
(discussing scope of the freedom of movement). 
139 RoGERS & ScANNELL, supra note 123, at 37-38, 40, 42-44 (describing relationship 
between the EU Charter and the European Convention on Human Rights). 
140 /d. 
141 Thomas C. Heller & Abraham D. Sofaer, Sovereignty, The Practitioners' Perspective, in 
PROBLEMATIC SovEREIGNTY,. CoNTESTED RuLES AND PoLITICAL PosSIBILITIES 35-37 (Stephen 
D~ Krasner, ed., 2001) (describing the evolved model of sovereignty reflected in the European 
Union system). See supra note. 135 (discussing theories of "global citizenship"). 
142 See supra notes 64-77 and accompanying text (describing existing caps and catego-
ries and problems of limitations and backlogs). 
143 See supra notes 47-59 and accompanying text (describing grounds for exclusion 
and removal). By far, the most expansive and frequently used category is the .crime-related 
grounds, particularly the subsection permitting removal based on conviction for an "aggra-
vated felony." DouGHERTY ET AL, supra note 55, at 5 (stating that 43 percent of removals in 
2005 were based on crime-related grounds); see also 8 U.S. C.§ 1227(a)(2)(A)(iii) (2ooo) (a non-
citizen "convicted of an aggravated felony at any time after admission is deportable"). 
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converse area of who may leave the relinquishment of citizenship. In the 
early days of the nation, at common law, an individual could not renounce 
his or her citizenship without the consent of the sovereign.144 The powers 
both to bestow and to release from citizenship were considered sovereign 
power~. 145 However, in the later 1800s, the United States began entering 
into reciprocal treaties with other countries, recognizing an individual 
right to renounce citizenship upon naturalization in a foreign country.146 
Denationalization the deprivation of nationality by unilateral fiat of the 
state has been increasingly disfavored in both international and domestic 
law.147 For the most part, the law now requires the consent of the individual, 
rather than the sovereign, to relinquish citizenship. 148 Full recognition of 
individual rights to self-determination, freedom of movement, and freedom 
from discrimination would require a similar shift in allocating the power to 
confer citizenship. 149 
The reasons to consider such a shift are evident. As a practical matter, 
the limitations on immigration and efforts at enforcement discussed 
above have failed to resolve the primary concerns that motivated them.150 
144 See Shanks v. Dupont, 28 U.S. 242, 246 (I8JO) ("The general doctrine is, that no 
persons can by any act of their own, without the consent of the government, put off their aJ-
legiance, and become aliens"); see oltio BROWNLIE, supra note 18, at 385-424. 
145 Chae Chan Ping v. United States (Chinese Exclusion Case), 130 U.S. 581, 604-os (1889) 
(listing a range of "sovereign" powers, including the power to "admit subjects of other na-
tions to citizenship"); Shanks, 28 U.S. at 246 (stating the general rule that a person cannot 
renounce citizenship without the consent of the government); see also BROWNLIE, supra note 
18, at 385-424. 
146 These agreements were known as ''Bancroft Treaties." See Charles Gordon, The 
Citizen 4nd the State: Power of Congress to Expatriate American Citizens, 53 GEo. L.j. 31 s, 322-23 
. . . 
(1965) (describing historical development); Peter j. Spiro, Dual Nationality and the Meaning 
of Citizenship, 46 EMORY L.J. 141 1, 1428 ( 1997) (discussing the context of the history of dual 
nationality). 
147 See supra notes 107-13 and accompanying text; see, e.g., Afroyim v. Rusk, 387 U.S. 
2S3, 262 ( 1967) (acknowledgiog constitutional right to remain a citizel) unless one voluntarily 
relinquishes); see also Universal Declaration, supra note 83, art. IS. 
148 Naturalized U.S. citizens are treated differently in this respect than U.S.-born citi-
zens. Both are subject to expaJriation, which is typically the voluntary relinquishment of 
citizenship. INA, 8 U.S.C. § 1481 (a) (2007) (focusing on voluntary actions of citizens by birth 
or naturalization). However, only naturalized citizens are subject to denaturalization. /d. § 
I4S 1 (stating various bases for revoking naturalization). 
149 Even with more expansive ways to assume citizenship, there would likely still be 
a process to pursue and perhaps even certain criteria to satisfy~ However, the presumption 
. . 
of availability would shift, and it would be more broadly available for those who choose it. 
Despite the current political climate, recent polls suggest that most Americans favor immigra-
tion reforms that would allow a path to citizenship for immigrants, even those who are in the 
country without authorization. SeeThe New York Times-CBS News Poll, Question 17, March 
7-11, 2007, at 14, available at bttp://graphics.nytimes.com/packages/pdf/national/20070313_ 
pollresults.pdf; Gallup Poll, Immigration at 1-2, 2007, available at http:/lwww.galluppoll.com/ 
content/default.aspx?ci:s 166o. 
ISO See Johnson, supra note 10, at 245-52 (discussing the problems of enforcement that 
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Over ~he past decade, and particularly since September 11, 2001, the 
immigration laws have become more and more strict, the bureaucracy 
has been dramatically expanded and additional resources have been 
devoted to enforcement.151 However, the public perception, and likely the 
reality, is that the "problem" of immigration particularly unauthorized 
immigra'tion has only increased}52 In fact, it appears that the policies of 
closure may have been counter-productive in several respects. Those who 
enter the U.S. without authorization are more likely to stay in the U.S. to 
avoid the risks of subsequent border crossings.153 The less the laws reflect 
a fair balance of policy, the more likely they are to encourage disrespect for 
the law.154 Perhaps most troubling, excessive enforcement efforts divert 
resources to marginal problems that could be used more efficiently for 
problems of serious concern, such as economic development and prevention 
of terrorism. 155 
In addition, more open borders offer the potential for both short-term 
and long-term benefits to the United States and on a larger global scale. 
A policy that is geared solely towards closure misses the opportunities 
offered by immigration.156 Undoubtedly the U.S. benefits from immigrant 
have arisen); Juss, supra note 19, at 309-11 (discussing practical difficulti~s in restricting mi-
gration); Pecoud & Guchteneire, supra note 1 o, at 4-5 (noting the consensus among experts 
that "tougher measures of migration control do not reach their proclaimed goal"). 
151 See supra note 57 (noting that the proposed budget for Customs and Border Protection 
for FY 2007 is approximately $8 billion and addressing the expanding numbers of personnel 
and scope of enforcement actions). See generally aoo5 YEARBOOK OF IMMIGRATION STATISTics, 
supra note 44· 
152 Although m.os.t Americans favor providing a path to citizenship for immigrants; con-
cerns about the rates. of unauthorized immigration remain high. See Th:e New York Times-
CBS News Poll, supra note 149, at 14, Questions 16-17;·see also Gallup Poll, supra note 149. 
1 53 See Pecoud & Guchteneire, supra note 1 o, at 13-1 4· 
154 See, e.g., J uss, supra note 19, at 31 1-12 (describing the counter-intuitive effect of"' get 
tough' asylum policies" in Europe· that ended up increasing '"irregular migration' ... 'in defi-
ance of national laws or regulations,). 
155 See Transactional Records Access Clearinghouse (TRAC), Immigration Enforcement: 
the Rhetoric, the Reality, ovailabl~ at http://trac.syr.edu/immigration/reports/I 78/ (last visited 
Oct. 13, 2007) (TRAC report based on analysis of records from the Immigration Courts and the 
Justice Department finds that only a "tiny fraction" of all Department of Homeland Security 
actions regarding immigration involve terrorism despite claims that this issue is a high prior-
ity mission of the DHS; instead, the. ()verwhelming majority of actions involve immigration 
charges, primarily violations based on entering the U.S. without inspection); see also johnson, 
supra note 10, at 26o-62 (discussing the opportunities to focus on issues such as national secu-
rity in an open border regime).; Nett, supra note 2, at 225 (discussing "social waste-" caused by 
diverting excessive resources to border control); Michael J. Trebilcock, The Law and Economics 
of Immigration Policy, 5 AM. L. & EcoN. REv. 271, 276-84 (2003) (discussing economic benefits 
of.immigration). 
156 Those benefits may 'be both tangible and intangible. Nett, supra note 2, at 225 (not-
ing advantages such as ~'remov[ingl the unrealistic ideas that people have about others,'' 
ameliorating some of the negative effects of nationalism, eliminating the "social waste" that 
derives from "situational inopportunity" and from excessive costs of enforcing borders). 
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labor both skilled and unskilled. 157 An open border will pro·mote more 
efficient allocation and use of labor and other economic resources, not just 
domestically, but also regionally and perhaps globally.158 In addition to 
economic benefits, there are also cultural benefits to diversity, increased 
family unification, and the respect for individual rights reflected in an open 
immigration policy. 159 Finally, and importantly, the emphasis on closed 
borders is inconsistent with many U.S. national and cultural values, including 
nondiscrimination, diversity, tolerance, individuality, self-determination, 
freedom of movement and association, and other rights protection.160 
CONCLUSION 
A call to consider "open borders" may seem utopian or even naive at this 
stage of U.S. immigration policy development and in the· context of the 
current political climate. At the end of my immigration course, I repeat 
the survey of where students .Place themselves on the policy spectrum, and 
often those who voted initially for open borders have moved themselves 
away from that position to another spot on the continuum. Interestingly, 
while we have typically lost the advocates for open borders, there has not 
yet been an increase in advocates for closed borders. Perhaps as their 
understanding· of the complexities of the system and the competing policy 
goals increases, students are reluctant to stake out an inflexible position at 
one end of the spectrum. However, U.S. immigration policy is currently 
doing just that staking out an inflexible position at the "closed borders" 
end of the spectrum. 
It is time to consider seriously the thoughtful and persuasive arguments 
that support rebalancing U.S. immigration policy by moving in the opposite 
direction, towards open borders. Many of these arguments are grounded 
in the same principles of international law that originally supported an 
absolure power to exclude inherent in a national sovereign and that have 
15 7 For an overview of the research on the impact of immigration on the economy, see 
Immigrants and the U.S. Economy Before the Subcomm. on Immigration of the S. Judiciary Comm, 
107th Cong. 16-38 (2001) (statement of Stephen Moore, Senior Fellow in Economics, Cato 
Institute). For an overview on labor of unauthorized immigrants, see jeffrey S. Passel, The Size 
and Characteristics of the Unauthorized Migrant Population in the U.S., Research Report, Pew 
Hispanic Center (March 7, 2006) at 9-13_, available at http://pewhispanic.org/files/reports/6I. 
pdf; see also Ernesto Zedi1lo, Migranomics Instead of Walls, FoRBES, jan. 8, 2007, at 25 (regarding 
importance of immigrant labor to the economy). 
I s8 See J USS; supra note I 9, at 3 I S-16 (discussing the "positive long-term effects of freer 
migration"); Pecoud & Guchteneire, supra note 10, at 9-13 (summarizing the positive eco-
nomic aspects of freer migration); Trebilcock, supra note 155, at 275-96 (discussing economic 
impact and perspectives on immigration). 
159 These values are identified as policy goals in existing immigration policy. See supra 
note 45 and accompanying text (discussing family-sponsored, employment-based and diver-
sity immigration). 
160 See supra note 127 and accompanying text. 
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now evolved to recognize the importance of individual human rights. The 
policies of "closure" have failed, and an unthinking adherence to them, or 
expansion of them, will only offer more of the same. An overemphasis on 
closure and enforcement ignores the potential opportunities and benefits 
of op-en immigration, in both the short-term and long-term and both 
domestically and globally. Ultimately, such policies disregard and even 
undermine core U.S. national and cultural values. 
As Congress considers, once again, legislation to reform U.S. immigration 
law, it is time to move beyond the unbalanced focus on limited guest 
worker programs and increased border enforcement. A new immigration 
policy should be grounded in principles of international law that balance 
respect for sovereignty with recognition of individual human rights; a more 
imaginative and effective immigration policy must reflect meaningful 
consideration of the merits of open bordeiS. 
. 
